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Introduction
Fisheries agreements between the Eu­
ropean Community (EC, or Community) 
and third countries1 have, like much of 
the European common fisheries policy 
(CFP), been a recurrent topic of debate. 
The policy itself has been repeatedly 
criticized for its failure to adequately 
address issues of ecological and, to a 
lesser degree, socioeconomic sustain­
ability in European fisheries. Critics of 
the policy’s international dimension add 
to these concerns a moral judgment of 
the righteousness of rich and powerful 
Europe buying fishery resources from 
poor and vulnerable countries (Kaczyn­
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ski and Fluharty, 2002; Bartels et al., 
2007; SSNC, 2009). 
Largely in response to this criticism, 
EC fisheries agreements have been sub­
ject to successive modifications in order 
to better account for issues of sustain­
ability and responsibility in fishing, and 
to enhance their potential contribution 
to broader socioeconomic development 
in those partner countries. The extent to 
which this has been achieved in the EC 
fisheries agreements with Cape Verde 
(CV) and São Tomé e Príncipe (STP) is 
the main subject of this paper.
Regarding the ecological sustainabil­
ity of the agreements, there are concerns 
about the level of knowledge about 
the status of many of the negotiated 
stocks, and the generally insufficient 
levels of monitoring and control of EC 
fleet activities. In general, EC fisheries 
agreements have been and continue to 
be implemented in contexts of insuf­
ficient information and control, and the 
two cases reviewed here constitute no 
exception.
Insufficient monitoring of activities at 
sea has, in some instances, had a parallel 
in inadequate tracking of the financial 
counterparts to the agreements. This 
often reflects a more widespread lack 
of capacity of public administrations 
in some of the poor countries that are 
partners to the agreements. Although 
improvements have been recorded in 
many of these countries, disparities still 
exist. CV and STP illustrate this point 
rather clearly, with the former displaying 
a capacity to apply and track EC funds 
that largely surpasses that of the latter.
The third issue analyzed is the degree 
to which fisheries agreements with the 
EC contribute to broader socioeconomic 
development in CV and STP. The moral 
disapproval of the agreements alluded to 
earlier has much to do with this particu­
lar point, as it is often believed that the 
only benefit of the agreements accru­
ing to third countries is the money that 
enters the state treasury and which, all 
too often, is not seen to improve the lives 
of poor fishing communities, which are 
those who stand to lose the most from 
having Community vessels fishing in 
their waters.
This paper discusses how these three 
issues have been handled in the fisher­
ies agreements between the EC and the 
two African countries. It will be shown 
Acronyms used in this paper.
ACP	 African,	Caribbean,	and	Pacific	Group	of	 
 States
CFP	 Common	fisheries	policy
CV	 Cape	Verde
EC	 European	Community
FPA	 Fisheries	partnership	agreement
ICCAT	 International	Commission	for	the	 
	 Conservation	of	Atlantic	Tunas
ILO	 International	Labour	Organization
INDP	 National	Fisheries	Development	Institute	of	 
	 Cape	Verde
NGO	 Nongovernmental	organization
RFMO	 Regional	Fisheries	Management	Organization
STP	 Republic	of	São	Tomé	e	Príncipe
UNCLOS		 United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the 
 Sea 
VMS	 Vessel	monitoring	system
1 Third country is the designation used in Euro­
pean policy circles to refer to countries other than 
the EC’s member states.
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ABSTRACT—Fisheries agreements with 
the European Community (EC) are an 
important component of the fisheries sector 
in Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe, 
constituting today a key source of income 
for the respective fisheries administra-
tion. In spite of this, and of the fact that 
these agreements have been renewed sev-
eral times over the past decades, chal-
lenges remain in domains such as control 
and communication of fishing activities, 
follow-up of financial counterparts, and 
integration of European fleets’ opera-
tions with the Cape Verdean and Santo-
mean economies. This paper analyzes the 
EC fisheries agreements with Cape Verde 
and São Tomé e Príncipe in terms of those 
domains, considering both the contents of 
the agreements and their practical imple-
mentation. The fisheries sector in each of 
these countries is reviewed, as are some 
of the fundamentals and criticisms of EC 
fisheries agreements. It is argued that the 
agreements with Cape Verde and São Tomé 
e Príncipe will not live up to the stated 
objectives of sustainability and responsi-
bility in fisheries until improvements are 
made to the control of EC vessels, the 
follow-up of funds paid by the EC, and the 
size and diversity of benefits accruing to 
the fisheries and related sectors in the two 
countries.
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Table 1.—Land mass, length of coastline, and EEZ of 
CV and STP.1
Item	 Cape	Verde	 São	Tomé	e	Príncipe
Land	mass	(sq.	km)	 4,033	 1,001
Coastline	(km)	 1,108	 210
EEZ	(sq.	km)	 734,000	 160,000
1Sources:	Government	of	Cape	Verde,	2004;	text	footnotes	
Rio4	and Oceanic	Développement	et	al.5.
that, notwithstanding improvements to 
the letter of the successive protocols 
and agreements, important challenges 
remain unsolved in practice, compro­
mising stated objectives relative to 
fisheries sustainability and responsibil­
ity, and to socioeconomic integration.
With this study, the existing body of 
literature on fisheries agreements in­
volving the EC is expanded in two ways: 
first, by focusing on two countries, the 
fisheries sectors of which have seldom 
been dealt with in scholarly literature, 
in particular in the English language; 
and second, by analyzing specific as­
pects of the fisheries agreements that 
the EC has signed with CV and STP. 
The reason for considering these two 
countries simultaneously lies not only in 
the similarities between the respective 
EC Fisheries Partnership Agreements 
(FPA), but especially in the fact that, 
despite important differences in how 
fisheries are managed in these countries, 
the implementation of those agreements 
currently faces similar challenges. 
The work presented here results first 
from the analysis of the contents of the 
fisheries agreements and respective pro­
tocols involving the EC and each of the 
two African countries.2 This analysis has 
been complemented with the few exist­
ing studies on the fisheries sectors of CV 
and STP, in particular with those dealing 
with implementation and consequences 
of those agreements. In addition, the 
author conducted observations and held 
interviews with individuals involved 
in fishing, fisheries and public fiscal 
administration, and marine surveillance 
and maritime activities in both countries, 
during the month of January 2010. 
The structure of this paper is as fol­
lows. First, the main characteristics of the 
fisheries sector in each of the two coun­
tries are reviewed. Then, an overview is 
provided of the rationale and evolution of 
EC fisheries agreements in general and 
of those with CV and STP in particular. 
Followed by three sections analyzing 
aspects related to fishing opportunities 
and control of fleet activities, manage­
ment of financial counterparts, and so­
cioeconomic integration of Community 
fleet activities. The conclusion considers 
how the shortcomings identified in each 
of these aspects can be addressed. 
Cape Verde and São Tomé e 
Príncipe Fisheries Sectors
The fisheries sectors in both Cape 
Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe are dom­
inated by traditional, small-scale fishing 
activities. This has been due, primarily, 
to an historical paucity of capital for in­
vestments in the sector, a situation that is 
common to most African fisheries (Heck 
et al., 2007). Since neither country has 
an operational distant­water fishing 
fleet, their fisheries sectors are shaped 
exclusively by the resources avail­
able in the respective national waters, 
principally those closest to shore. 
Both countries are archipelagic states 
located in the central eastern Atlantic, 
CV about 350 nmi west of Senegal, 
and STP about 200 nmi west of Equa­
torial Guinea and Gabon, in the Gulf of 
Guinea (Fig. 1 and 2). CV is composed 
of ten islands, of which nine are inhab­
ited3, whereas STP consists of the two 
islands that compose the name of the 
country. Both archipelagos have many 
islets. Table 1 presents data relative to 
the geography of the two countries. 
The volcanic origin and the large 
average depths of the sea bottoms 
around the two archipelagos result in 
comparatively narrow insular shelves, 
the sea areas above the shelf down to 
the 200 m isobath amounting only to 
1,572 sq. km in STP and 5,394 sq. km 
in CV (Rio4; Oceanic Développment 
et al.5). In both cases there are areas 
where the shelves are less abrupt and 
where levels of biological productivity 
are substantially higher than those of 
deeper waters. These areas have tradi­
tionally been important fishing grounds 
for demersal and small pelagic species 
in both countries. 
In CV, two particularly important 
areas exist, one in the windward (bar­
lavento) group of islands extending 
from S. Antão in the west to S. Nicolau 
in the east, and the other spanning the 
sea area to the south of the island of Sal 
and around the islands of Boavista and 
Maio. In STP, the extended insular shelf 
is found south of the island of Príncipe 
and encompassing the Tinhosas islets. 
The average levels of marine biomass 
in the EEZ’s of both countries are rela­
tively low. Table 2 provides estimated 
volumes of exploitable fishery resources 
in the two countries.
Current exploitation levels are be­
lieved to fall much shorter than the ex­
ploitable potentials, estimates pointing 
at total yearly catches in CV between 
7,500 and 10,800 t (INDP, Nd.; Govern­
ment of Cape Verde, 2004; Fonseca6), 
and in STP of approximately 4,000 t for 
artisanal fisheries (FAO7; CETMAR8), 
although Rio4 proposes the figure of 
3,000–3,500 t. The notable exceptions 
to this situation of presumed under­
exploitation are the high­value lobster 
fisheries in CV, which are considered 
fully exploited in the case of muddy 
spiny lobster, Palinurus charlestoni 
(locally known as lagosta­rosa), and 
2 The texts of the agreements and protocols are 
publicly accessible through the EurLex legal 
database, online at http://eur­lex.europa.eu. 
3 St. Luzia, the smallest of the ten islands, is occa­
sionally inhabited by fishermen from neighbor­
ing islands. It is, however, considered officially 
uninhabited.
4 Rio, J. M. C. 2006. Horizon 2012. Vers un 
développement intégré, durable et responsable 
du littoral. Sous secteur de la pêche artisanale. 
MARAPA, S. Tomé, STP, 305 p. 
5 Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic 
Resources Management Ltd., and Megapesca 
Lda. 2004a. Interim/ex post evaluation of the cur­
rent protocol to the fisheries agreement between 
the European Community and the Republic of 
São Tomé e Príncipe, and analysis of the impact 
of the future protocol on sustainability, includ­
ing ex ante evaluation. Unpubl. final rep., FPA 
1/STP/04.
6 Fonseca, B. O. 2000. Expansion of pelagic fish­
eries in Cape Verde. A feasibility study. United 
Nations Univ., Fish. Training Program, Reykja­
vik, Iceland, 27 p.
7 FAO. 2009. Programa integrado de reestrutu­
ração da pesca. Relatório FAO/SFC/STP. Minis­
tério da Agricultura, Desenvolvimento Rural e 
Pesca, São Tomé, STP, 67 p. 
8 CETMAR. 2009. Diagnóstico e proposta de 
plano operativo para promover o desenvolvim­
ento da pesca artesanal em São Tomé e Príncipe. 
AECID, São Tomé, STP, 61 p.
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Figure 1.—Cape Verde (Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cape_verde.html).
Table 2.—Estimated volumes of exploitable fishery resources in CV and STP.
Country	 Estimated	resources	(t/yr)	 Source	 Comments
Cape	Verde	 32,500–41,600	 
	 (of	which	25,000–30,000	large	pelagic	species)	 Government	of	Cape	Verde,	2004
	 36,000–44,000		 Almeida	et	al.,	2003
	 38,000–47,000		 Text	footnote	Fonseca6
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe	 12,000	coastal	species		 Text	footnote	Rio4	 No	estimate	for	large	pelagic	species,	but	reference	to	8,500	t/yr 
	 (of	which	3,600	demersal	species)	  in	EC	agreement
	 12,000	coastal	species	 
	 (of	which	4,000	coastal	pelagics,	2,000	demersals,		 Text	footnote	FAO7	 Estimate	for	large	pelagic	based	on	Russian	surveys	from	the 
	 and	6,000	shellfish	species)	and	17,000	large	pelagic			 mid	1980’s	(Adelino	et	al.,	2005). 
	 species	  
over­exploited, in the case of coastal 
species such as green spiny lobster, 
Panulirus regius; brown spiny lobster, 
Panulirus echinatus; and slipper lobster, 
Scyllarides latus.
In neither of these countries are there 
any systematic and comprehensive pro­
cedures for collecting data on fishing 
effort or catches from artisanal fisher­
ies, this being especially true in STP. 
This fact explains much of the vari­
ability in the estimates presented above. 
With regard to large migratory pelagic 
species, foreign fleets account for the 
majority of catches. With the exception 
of Japanese vessels operating in San­
tomean waters (Costa9), there are no 
reliable data on these catches, although, 
as will be discussed later for the case of 
EC vessels, this is in contravention to 
the fisheries agreements with the EC. 
As alluded to above, artisanal forms 
of fishing predominate in both STP and 
CV. Such dominance is absolute in the 
former country, given the absence of 
industrial and semi-industrial fishing 
fleets.10 The figures relative to the size 
9 Costa, G., Dir. Gen. Fisheries, São Tomé, STP. 
Personal commun., 28 Jan. 2010.
10 Following independence, the Santomean gov­
ernment attempted to operate an industrial fish­
ing fleet. An economic failure, the project was 
abandoned after a few years (Espirito Santo, 
2009; Rio4). More recently, the national media 
Continued on page 5.
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Figure 2.—São Tomé e Príncipe (Source: http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/stp/index.html).
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10 (continued) discussed the possibility of gov­
ernment reentering the industrial fishing busi­
ness by rehabilitating some of the vessels of the 
ill-fated Astipesca fishing company. The fact 
that Astipesca’s abandoned ships have capsized, 
grounded, or simply disappeared might explain 
why no visible steps have actually been taken.
of the fisheries sectors and subsectors, 
including fleet sizes, species composi­
tion, and employment levels show im­
portant discrepancies between different 
sources. This fact, which is particularly 
evident in the case of STP, is due not 
only to temporal variations in each of 
those dimensions—e.g. people entering 
or leaving the profession; boats that are 
built and dismantled—but also the low 
frequency of data collection campaigns 
and, to a lesser extent, to differences in 
the classifications used (e.g. in regards 
to boat types). The informal nature of 
most of the artisanal fisheries sector in 
both countries also renders systematic 
data collection and follow­up both dif­
ficult and costly. Table 3 summarizes 
data relative to the size of the Santomean 
fisheries sector.
The decapitalization of the artisanal 
sector identified in the 2004 evaluation 
of the EC fisheries agreement appears to 
have been reversed in recent years (Oce­
anic Développement et al.5), considering 
the figures relative to the size of the fleet 
and the respective rate of motorization. 
Still, this apparent reversal of the earlier 
decline must be considered with care. 
First, many of the improvements in the 
Santomean fleet have been funded by 
donor money and hence do not mirror a 
de facto increase of investment capabili­
ties or an actual accumulation of capital 
by local shipowners. Second, there has 
been a stagnation of catches from arti­
sanal fisheries at an estimated 4,000 t/
year (FAO7; CETMAR8), suggesting 
Table 3.—Employment and fleet size in the Santomean 
fisheries sector in 1995, 2003, and 2007.1
Item	 1995	 2003	 2007
No.	of	fishermen	 2,060	 1,989	 2,428
No.	of	fish	vendors	 	 Note2	 2,052
No.	of	fishing	boats	 1,840	 1,614	 1,921
Motorization	rate	(%)	 36	 21	 23
1	Sources:	text	footnotes	Rio4;	Oceanic	Développement	et	
al.5;	and	CETMAR8.
2	An	estimate	of	6,000	fish	vendors	 in	2000	 is	mentioned	
in	 Oceanic	 Développement	 et	 al.	 This	 number	 seems	
excessive	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 figure	 for	 2007,	 even	
considering	the	variability	of	employment	in	this	activity.
that productivity in the sector has not 
been affected by apparent improvements 
in equipment. In this respect, it has 
recently been suggested that “[f]isher ­ 
men take advantage of motorization 
more as a safety measure and as a means 
of spending less time at sea, than as a 
factor enabling them to fish in more 
productive, but also more distant fishing 
grounds” (FAO7: 21).
Rio4 describes six main units of 
artisanal fisheries in STP according to 
vessel and gear types. Table 4 sum­
marizes these units, to which beach 
seines, an ancient and declining form 
of fishing, has been added. Some of the 
fisheries carried out by larger motor­
ized fiberglass vessels (corresponding 
to the two bottom rows in Table 4) are 
sometimes referred to as the Santomean 
semi-industrial fleet (Oceanic Dével­
oppement et al.5; FAO7; Adelino et 
al.11). Others oppose this classification, 
arguing that STP does not have any 
processing industry that such vessels 
supply, and that the vessels are too small 
to qualify as semi­industrial. Designa­
tions such as “offshore artisanal” or 
“advanced artisanal” are then preferred 
(Rio4; Aníbal12). 
Demersal fish stocks found in the 
coastal waters of STP, which constitute 
the mainstay of most artisanal fisher­
ies, combine elements of eastern and 
western central Atlantic stocks (Oceanic 
Développment et al.5). Some of these 
have been considered to have com­
Table 4.—Main types of artisanal fisheries in São Tomé e Príncipe, including targeted species.1 
Description	 Targeted	species	 No.
Harpoon	fishing;	divers	from	beaches	or	from	small	canoes.	 Demersal	fishes	and	cephalopods;	Marine	turtles.	 350	divers
Beach	seines,	trawling,	and	seining	to	beach	 Demersal	fishes	and	cephalopods	 Unknown
Hand	lines	and	gillnets	for	both	surface	and	bottom	fishing;	small	wooden	canoes	(3–6	m)	with	sail	and	oars.	 Demersal	fish	species,	occasionally	small	pelagics	 1,012	canoes
Gillnets	for	surface	and	bottom	fishing;	medium-sized	wooden	boats	(6–8	m)	with	motor	(8–15	h.p.)	 Demersal	fish	species,	occasionally	small	pelagics	 290	boats
Purse	seine	nets;	large	wooden	boats	(8–12	m)	with	motor	(25–20	h.p.)	 Small	pelagic	fish	species	 114	boats
Hand	line	for	surface	and	bottom	fishing;	large	open	deck	fiberglass	boats	(8–13	m)	with	motor	 Demersal	fish	species,	occasionally	small	pelagics	 3	boats
Hand	line	for	surface	and	bottom	fishing;	large	closed	deck	fiberglass	boats	(8–13	m)	with	motor	 Demersal	fish	species,	occasionally	small	pelagics	 2	boats
1Sources:	text	footnote	Rio4	and	Oceanic	Développement	et	al.5.
11 Adelino, F., E. Moniz, and M. Nascimento. 
2005. Evaluation de la contribution socio-écon-
omique de la pêche au PIB et au développement 
de São Tomé e Príncipe. Sustainable Fisheries 
Livelihoods Programme, DFID, London, U.K., 
and FAO, Rome, Italy, 20 p.
12 Aníbal, O. Director, Dir. Gen. Fisheries, S. 
Tomé, STP. Personal commun., 20 Jan. 2010.
mercial potential in European markets, 
namely seabreams, Pagrus spp. (locally 
known as pargo) and wreckfish, Poly-
prion americanus (locally known as 
cherne). Small pelagics are caught both 
by Santomean artisanal fishermen and 
by foreign industrial fleets, although in 
the case of the latter, the principal target 
are large migratory pelagic species, 
such as yellowfin tuna, Thunnus alba-
cares; bigeye tuna, T. obesus; skipjack 
tuna, Katsuwonus pelamis; Atlantic 
swordfish, Xiphias gladius; and various 
species of sharks, such as hammerhead, 
Sphyrna spp.; mako, Isurus spp.; and 
blue shark, Prionace glauca (Oceanic 
Développement et al.5). Although for­
eign fleets stand for most of the catches 
of large migratory pelagics, some of the 
smaller species are frequently caught by 
local artisanal vessels and are commonly 
found in Santomean markets. These 
include mackerel and round scad, De-
capterus macarellus and D. punctatus; 
Spanish sardine, Sardinella aurita; and 
different species of carangids and flying-
fish, Cheilopogon spp. 
Artisanal fishing is carried out in the 
coastal waters of the Santomean archi­
pelago. The degree of motorization and 
the availability of safety equipment on 
board determine the distance from shore 
where fishermen decide to operate. 
Fishermen from the island of Príncipe 
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Figure 3.—Arrival of fishing boats at Praia Gamboa, STP, showing typical fiberglass 
vessel and large wooden dugout canoes used in coastal fisheries.
and larger vessels from S. Tomé often 
fish in the richer grounds to the south 
of Príncipe. Most of the fleet, however, 
consists of dugout canoes unsuited for 
navigation beyond a few nautical miles 
from the coast (Fig. 3, 4). 
Capture activities are the exclusive re­
sponsibility of men. They also carry out 
the first sale, which typically takes place 
on the beach upon arrival from a fishing 
trip. From this stage onward, women 
take the lead on all processing and 
commercialization of fish products. As 
is also the case in CV, women perform 
their work in complete independence 
from men, and are solely responsible 
for managing the economic and financial 
aspects of commercialization. Fish pro­
cessing exists only in relatively incipient 
forms, limited mostly to sporadic salting 
and smoking. Recently, a small coopera­
tive processing unit was established with 
the assistance of the nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) MARAPA, the 
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, and the Spanish coopera­
tion agency AECID, enabling women to 
produce and sell different products with 
higher added value.13 Conservation fa­
cilities are scarce and poorly maintained, 
which poses additional problems for the 
conservation of fishery products in an 
equatorial country where fish processing 
is minimal and often inadequate. 
The institutional set-up of the fisher­
ies sector is relatively underdeveloped. 
Government structures include the min­
istry responsible for fisheries and the 
respective directorate general. Maritime 
surveillance and policing of the whole 
of the EEZ is the responsibility of the 
coast guard, while the ports captaincy of 
STP—itself part of the coast guard—is 
tasked with near­shore patrolling of all 
maritime activities, including granting 
and controlling fishing licenses. Fisher­
13 This processing unit is part of a larger mar­
keting cooperative named Copafresco, which 
aims at improving the processing, transportation, 
and commercialization of fish products in STP. It 
currently handles over 15,000 kg of fresh fish per 
year (IFAD. 2009. Implementation of the second 
cycle of the Participatory Smallholder Agricul­
ture and Artisanal Fisheries Development Pro­
gramme. Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and 
Principe. EB 2009/98/INF.3. Int. Fund for Agric. 
Develop., Rome, Italy, 10 p.).
men’s associations have been formally 
established in the past but, apart from 
a few exceptions, are mostly inopera­
tive today.
NGO’s with persistent and extended 
work in the sector are limited to one, 
MARAPA, although other organizations 
working with local development issues 
sometimes also support fishing activi­
ties. Finally, the ubiquitous presence of 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
agencies has manifested itself through­
out the years since independence in the 
financing and implementation of numer­
ous projects in the sector, of which many 
have failed.14 
Figures relative to the size of the 
artisanal fisheries subsector in CV are 
presented in Table 5. More than one-
third of all artisanal fishermen and fish 
vendors are registered in the island of 
Santiago, itself home to more than half 
of the country’s resident population. 
CV has semi-industrial and industrial 
fleets of some dimension, dedicated to 
fisheries of tunas and tuna-like species, 
small pelagics, and deep­water lobster. 
Together, these fleets are composed of 
some 70 vessels of varying sizes (8–25 
m; 2.5–121 GRT15) and engine power, 
employing an estimated 840 people, up 
from approximately 600 at the turn of 
the millennium (Almeida et al., 2003; 
Fonseca6; FAO and DFID16). The tuna 
Table 5.—Employment and fleet size in the Cape 
Verdean artisanal fisheries subsector in 1999 and 
2005.1,2
Item	 1999	 2005
No.	of	fishermen	 4,283	 3,108
No.	of	fish	vendors	 Note3	 893
No.	of	fishing	boats	 1,267	 1,036
Motorization	rate	(%)	 73	 74
1	Sources:	FAO,	2004;	Government	of	Cape	Verde,	2004;	
text	footnote	FAO	and	DFID16.
2	Silva,	O.,	 INDP,	Mindelo,	CV.	Personal	commun.,	6	Apr.	
2010.
3	Government	of	Cape	Verde	(2004:	45)	refers	to	an		
estimate	 of	 3,500	 fish	 vendors	 in	 2000.	 This	 number	
seems	 excessive	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 figure	 for	 2005,	
which	results	from	a	survey	conducted	by	the	INDP	in	all	
fishing	communities	in	CV.
14 In recent years, two of the most visible fail­
ures were the Spanish-funded fisheries com­
plex at the port of Neves, which, after an initial 
investment of 1.5 million Euros in 2000, was 
abandoned in 2004; and the Taiwan­funded 
fish auction built outside the capital city in a 
place allegedly unsuited for berthing, which 
has never been used and is said to be awaiting 
conversion to a hospital.
15 Gross Registered Tonnage.
16 FAO and DFID. 2005. Evaluation de la contri­
bution socio-économique du secteur des pêches 
au PIB et au développement rural au Cap Vert. 
Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Programme, 
DFID, London, U.K., and FAO, Rome, Italy, 43 p. 
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fleet operates different fishing gears ac­
cording to season, including longlines 
and pole­and­line for tunas (primarily 
skipjack and yellowfin), hand-held lines 
for demersals, purse seines for small 
pelagic, and traps for lobster. The lobster 
fleet is smaller in size—four vessels 
in the early 2000’s—and is composed 
of larger 15–22 m vessels that, during 
October–June, target primarily muddy 
spiny lobster (Almeida et al., 2003). 
A third segment of the semi­industrial 
and industrial fleets has been proposed 
by Almeida et al. (2003), comprising 
about 70 vessels of length greater than 
6.5 m operating purse seines to catch 
small pelagic species such as mackerel 
scad, round scad, and bigeye scad, Selar 
crumenophthalmus. Catches from the in­
dustrial and semi-industrial fleets are pri­
marily for export and for Cape Verdean 
processing industries (Fonseca6). These 
are concentrated in the islands of San­
tiago, S. Vicente, and Sal, and to a lesser 
extent in S. Nicolau and S. Antão.
Artisanal fishing is of greater im­
portance than its industrial and semi­
industrial counterparts, not only for the 
number of people and vessels employed, 
but also because catch levels are ap­
proximately twice those of the latter 
subsectors (FAO, 2004). Five main 
artisanal fisheries have been identified 
in CV, as indicated in Table 6. Most of 
them take place on all islands. Pending 
weather conditions and vessels char­
acteristics (Fig. 5, 6), fishermen often 
travel to other islands and offshore fish­
ing grounds. In particular, the two areas 
of extended insular shelf, described 
previously, congregate fishermen from 
different, often distant islands.
The organization of the artisanal 
subsector in CV shares a number of 
commonalities with the organization 
Table 6.—Main types of artisanal fisheries in Cape Verde, including targeted species.1
Description	 Targeted	species	 No.
Divers	from	small	boats,	at	depths	up	to	25	m,	both	free	diving	and	scuba	diving	(illegal);	may	include	gillnets		 Coastal	lobster,	mollusks,		demersal	fish	species	 Unknown 
and	traps	for	lobsters	and	mollusks	 and	cephalopods	
Beach	seines,	trawling,	and	seining	to	beach	 Small	pelagic	fish	species	 50	units	(1999)
Gillnets	for	surface	fishing	from	boats;	concentrated	in	Santiago	(82%),	S.	Vicente,	and	S.	Antão	 Small	pelagic	fish	species	(Blackspot	picarel,		 Unknown 
	 Spicara	melanurus,	ca.	85%)	
Purse	seines	for	surface	fishing;	medium-sized	boats	(9–10	m)	with	outboard	motors	 Small	pelagic	fish	species	 24	units
Hand	lines	for	surface	and	bottom	fishing;	small	and	medium-sized	boats	(3–9	m)	with	outboard	motors.	 Tunas	and	tuna-like	species	and	demersal	fish		 1,229	boats 
	 species,	alternatively	
1Source:	Almeida	et	al.,	2003.
Figure 4.—“Prao” canoe with sail in STP. Photo courtesy of Jorge Carvalho do Rio.
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Figure 5.—Small nonmotorized artisanal fishing boats at Baía das Gatas, SV, CV.
in STP. Capture activities are pre­
dominantly male—with the notable 
exception of the fishing community in 
Porto Rincão, Santiago, where women 
are both fishermen and vendors—while 
women engage in post­capture process­
ing and commercialization, again in an 
Figure 6.—Motorized artisanal fishing boats outside Tarrafal, ST, CV.
utterly autonomous manner. Important 
fish markets include those of Praia 
(Santiago) and Mindelo (S. Vicente), as 
well as the touristic island of Sal. Fish 
products, being an important part of the 
diet of most Cape Verdeans, are also 
sold in all fishing communities along 
the coast, as well as in towns further 
inland. As in STP, most fish is sold and 
consumed fresh, salting and smoking 
being the two most common artisanal 
processing techniques. 
The larger fish canning plants based 
in S. Vicente, S. Nicolau, and Santiago 
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are supplied primarily by the Cape 
Verdean semi-industrial and indus­
trial fleets, although some of the 
supply is imported.17 Following the 
1999–2003 embargo of fish exports 
to the European market, CV has seen 
significant improvements to its fish 
storage and processing facilities. Ex­
ports have since been resumed, to the 
extent that in 2009 fresh and canned 
fish products topped the list of Cape 
Verdean exports, accounting, respec­
tively, for 39.9% and 29.8% in value 
of all exports (INE18). Ice production 
plants exist in Mindelo and Praia and 
are used both by local fishermen and 
vendors and by those coming from 
other islands. 
The institutional organization of the 
fisheries sector is comparatively more 
elaborate than that of STP. At the top 
of the official hierarchy one finds the 
fisheries ministry, supported by an 
office for studies and planning, and a 
multi­sectoral consultative council, fol­
lowed by the Directorate­General for 
Fisheries. An autonomous state body, 
the National Fisheries Development 
Institute (INDP, Instituto Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento das Pescas), carries 
out scientific work, as well as develop­
ment initiatives in the sector, the latter 
predominantly addressing problems 
of small-scale fisheries. A develop­
ment fund has also been established, 
in 1994, to provide credit for private 
investments in the sector.19 
Fishing associations, often including 
both artisanal fishermen and vendors, 
have been rising both in number and 
importance during the past decade. With 
the assistance of the INDP,  NGO’s, 
and, occasionally, the Directorate­
General for Fisheries, they have been 
instrumental in fostering development 
in fishing communities, not only in 
relation to fishing activities, but also to 
other societal needs. The association of 
fisheries shipowners, based in Mindelo, 
represents the interests of the industrial 
and semi-industrial fleets. Numerous 
environment and development NGO’s 
operate locally in fishing communities. 
Responsibility for maritime surveil­
lance and policing rests, in nearshore 
waters, with the maritime police, and, 
in the remainder of the EEZ, with the 
coast guard. Similar to the situation in 
STP, the work of these forces has been 
limited by recurrent insufficiency of 
financial and technical means.
The Evolution of EC Fisheries 
Agreements
Since the second half of the 1970’s, 
the EC has been signing agreements 
enabling the distant­water fleets of 
its member states to fish in the waters 
of third countries. The need to enter 
into such agreements arose during 
that decade as it became clear that, 
in the course of the third United Na­
tions Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), an increasing number 
of countries made efforts to extend 
their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) 
to 200 nmi. An estimated 90% of all 
known fishery resources came thereby 
under the exclusive control of those 
states, and fishing fleets worldwide 
were forced to negotiate their access 
to waters where they had fished freely 
in the past (Bartels et al., 2007). This 
affected the fishing fleets of EC member 
states of that time, where approxi­
mately 9% of consumed fish products 
originated from those waters (Court of 
Auditors, 2001). 
As per a resolution of the European 
Council of 3 Nov. 197620, EC member 
states transferred the power of signing 
fisheries agreements to the EC itself, 
an arrangement that persists to this day. 
This transfer of competencies has been 
justified with three arguments by the EC 
Commission (CEC, 2002). First, were 
the EC not involved in negotiations 
with third countries, then there would 
be no entity defending the interests 
of the European distant-water fishing 
fleet. Shipowners would simply enter 
into private arrangements with gov­
ernments in third countries, and most 
likely register their vessels either in the 
country where they intended to fish, in 
order to be allowed to operate there; or 
with a flag of convenience, in order to 
reduce operational costs. Hence the EC 
distant-water fleet would not disappear 
by decommissioning of ships, but by 
their transfer to non­EC states. 
Why individual member states, in 
the absence of direct EC involvement, 
would not try to secure their national 
fleets themselves is not explained by 
the Commission. A possible explana­
tion might be that individual countries 
would not be willing to subsidize state­
led agreements to the same extent as the 
EC has done, and this would probably 
lead shipowners to reflag to the most 
convenient option, as pointed out by the 
Commission.
The second argument is that the 
fishery resources themselves would be 
worse off under private arrangements 
than under EC agreements, simply be­
cause the fleets that would be granted 
access to those resources under private 
agreements operate by “criteria and 
conditions [that] may not conform to 
those of a global sustainable fisheries 
policy” (CEC, 2002: 6), which, alleg­
edly, is what guides EC agreements 
and the European distant-water fishing 
fleet. In regards to this argument, it is 
worth mentioning that the legal basis 
of fisheries agreements is the UNCLOS, 
in particular article 62, that provides for 
signatory coastal states to “give other 
States access to the surplus of the al­
lowable catch.” This is to be done with 
the aim of attaining “optimum utiliza­
tion of living resources in the exclusive 
17 That local processing plants import fish is not 
well received in CV, especially among those 
involved in industrial and semi-industrial fisher­
ies. An often cited example is that of the Span­
ish­owned company Frescomar, which owns a 
plant outside Mindelo, SV. It has been accused of 
refusing to buy fish from Cape Verdean shipown­
ers and instead importing fish landed by Spanish 
vessels elsewhere.
18 INE. 2010. Resultados do comércio externo, 
ano 2009. Inst. Nacional Estatística, Praia, ST, 
CV. Online at http://www.ine.cv, accessed on 24 
Feb. 2010.
19 In STP, a similar fund was created, also in 
1994, through decree­law no. 4/94 (Diário da 
República No. 3, 31 Mar. 1994:13–14). How­
ever, the functioning of the fund was never 
regulated and the government never actually 
allocated funds to it, which meant that, in prac­
tice, the fund never existed. In recent years, the 
Ministry of Economy and FAO have been work­
ing on a fund for rural development, encompass­
ing agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. 
20 Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on 
certain external aspects of the creation of a 200­
mile fishing zone in the Community with effect 
from 1 January 1977. Off. J. Eur. Comm. C, No. 
105, 7 May 1981:1.
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economic zone,” and in the context of 
the coastal state’s lack of capacity to 
harvest the entire allowable catch. 
In this scenario, it is likely that 
states—in particular poorer, indebted 
ones—would be tempted to sell the 
estimated surplus if that translates into 
revenues that they would otherwise not 
have. However true this supposition 
may be (see Kaczynski and Fluharty, 
2002), the suggestion by the Com­
mission that EC fisheries agreements 
constitute the best possible alternative 
in terms of resource utilization is far­
fetched and not entirely well­founded. 
Indeed, evaluations of the agreements 
have drawn attention to the fact that 
insufficiencies in terms of stock as­
sessments and follow­up, control of 
bycatch, fleet surveillance and moni­
toring, generation and sharing of data 
and of law enforcement capability have 
rendered much of the fishing carried 
out under the agreements unsustainable 
(ADE et al., 2002; Bartels et al., 2007; 
Walmsley et al., 2007).
The Commission’s third argument 
is more convincing, as it notes that 
the fisheries sector in third countries 
is more likely to benefit from the 
financial counterpart paid by the EC 
than from the fees paid by shipowners 
for private agreements. The reason for 
this is that the funds earmarked for 
specific targeted actions are provided 
for in the former, but are assumed to 
be absent from the latter type of agree­
ment. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to 
imagine that, unless forced otherwise, 
the governments of third countries 
would use financial counterparts from 
fisheries agreements to address their 
immediate priorities, which very 
seldom include fisheries sector de­
velopment. It is also highly unlikely 
that individual shipowners signing 
hypothetical private agreements would 
ever be interested in instructing the 
governments of third countries about 
how to spend their money. The EC, 
operating on a state­to­state level, is 
capable of doing so.
The first fisheries agreement signed 
by the EC was with the United States 
of America in 1977 (Witbooi, 2008; 
IFREMER21). The first country of the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group 
of States (ACP) to sign a fisheries 
agreement with the EC was Senegal in 
1979. By the early 1990’s, the number 
of agreements with developing coun­
tries had risen to 18 (Walmsley et al., 
2007). Currently, there are 20 FPA’s 
between the EC and ACP countries, of 
which those with Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Mauritius, and Senegal do not 
have a protocol in force, meaning that 
no fishing by EC vessels is taking place 
in the respective waters; one FPA with 
Greenland; and three reciprocal access 
agreements with Iceland, Norway, and 
the Faeroe Islands (CEC22). 
The earlier agreements, commonly 
termed fisheries access agreements, de­
fined “the level, the terms of allocation 
and the use of rights of access to fish 
resources in the exclusive economic 
zones of third countries” (Court of 
Auditors, 2001:4). These agreements 
were classified as either first- or sec­
ond­generation, the former comprising 
1) reciprocal agreements, whereby 
the EC and third countries exchanged 
fishing possibilities for the respective 
fleets, without payment of any financial 
compensation; 2) agreements involving 
financial compensation in return for 
fishing possibilities and without any 
further reciprocity (most agreements 
with ACP countries were of this type); 
and 3) agreements involving financial 
compensation and access to European 
markets of fish products from the third 
countries without custom duties or 
quantitative restrictions (the agreement 
with Greenland was of this type). 
Second­generation agreements were 
much less frequent, having only been 
signed with Argentina, Namibia, Esto­
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and involved 
the transfer of EC vessels to the third 
countries as part of joint­ventures 
to which fishing opportunities were 
granted (Court of Auditors, 2001; Wit­
booi, 2008). All of these earlier agree­
ments, “negotiated and signed as purely 
commercial arrangements” (Kaczynski 
and Fluharty, 2002:77), had as main 
objectives to supply European markets 
and processing industries with raw fish 
products, to secure fishing opportuni­
ties for the Community’s distant­water 
fleet, and to create employment oppor­
tunities both on-board fishing vessels 
and on shore in up­ and down­stream 
sectors (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002; 
Gorez23). 
All first-generation agreements other 
than reciprocal ones have been replaced 
after 2004 by FPA’s, following the 2002 
reform of the Community’s CFP. These 
new instruments were proposed as com­
ponents of broader Economic Partner­
ship Agreements between the EC and 
ACP countries (Mbithi Mwikya, 2006), 
and, accordingly, were guided by con­
cerns of sustainability and responsibility 
in fishing, development of fisheries and 
related sectors, and, ultimately, poverty 
reduction (CEC, 2002; Witbooi, 2008). 
In relation to earlier access agreements, 
if the stated purpose of these was to 
provide for fishing opportunities for EC 
vessels in the waters of third countries, 
that of FPA’s is to enable sustainable 
and responsible fishing opportunities 
for that fleet, while contributing to 
broader development objectives in the 
third countries.
The Cases of CV and STP
The first agreements on fishing op­
portunities between the Community and, 
respectively, STP and CV, date back to 
1984 and 1990. In both cases, these ini­
tial agreements have been prolonged—
through amendments, subsidiary agree­
ments, and revision of protocols—until 
their replacement by FPA’s. These were 
signed on 30 Oct. 2007 for the case of 
STP—the respective protocol, however, 
covering the period from 1 June 2006 to 
31 May 2010— and on 12 Feb. 2007 for 
the case of CV—with the corresponding 
protocol running from 30 Mar. 2007 
21 IFREMER. 1999. Evaluation of the fisheries 
agreements concluded by the European Com­
munity. Summary Report, 38 p. Online at http://
ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/
rsen.pdf, accessed on 13 Dec. 2009.
22 CEC. N.d. Bilateral fisheries partnership agree-
ments between the EC and third countries. Online 
at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external_rela­
tions/bilateral_agreements_en.htm, accessed on 
14 Feb. 2010.
2 3 Gorez, B. 2005. Policy study: EU-ACP fish­
eries agreements. Coalition for Fair Fisheries, 
Brussels, Belgium, 44 p.
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(date of entry into force of the FPA) to 
31 Aug. 2011.24 
The agreements with the two coun­
tries have evolved towards greater 
complexity. The purpose of the 1984 
STP and 1990 CV agreements was 
relatively simple, namely “to establish 
the principles and rules [governing], in 
all respects the fishing activities of ves­
sels flying the flags of Member States 
of the Community” in the waters under 
jurisdiction of each of the two countries 
(Council Regulation, 1984). The 1987 
amendment brought no changes to the 
text of the agreement with STP, having 
served only to update and expand the 
annex laying down the conditions under 
which fishing activities were to be car­
ried out. All subsequent changes to these 
conditions involved only the revision of 
protocols to the agreement at intervals 
of 3 or sometimes 4 years. This was 
done in the form of official exchanges 
of letters between the governments of 
each of the countries and the EC. The 
original agreements themselves, with an 
initial duration of 3 years upon entry into 
force, were automatically renewed for 
successive periods of 1 year in the case 
of STP, and 2 years in the case of CV, 
as per articles 12 and 13, respectively.
The initial agreements with the two 
countries are, to a large extent, identical. 
Further to the generic purpose men­
tioned above, they pledge adherence 
to the UNCLOS and to the fisheries 
laws and regulations of each country. 
Fishing by EC vessels is conditional 
on authorization granted by Santomean 
and Cape Verdean authorities, and it is 
always subject to the issuing of specific 
licenses. 
24 As of July 2011, the FPA with STP had not yet 
formally entered into force, as the Santomean 
state had not yet notified the EC on the comple­
tion of the ratification process. The protocol is, 
nevertheless, in force by virtue of another agree­
ment, in the form of an exchange of letters on the 
provisional application of the protocol. To this 
end, refer to Council Decision 2007/532/EC, Off. 
J. Eur. Union L, No. 205, 7 Aug. 2007:35–62. A 
new protocol covering the period Jun. 2010–May 
2013 was approved by the EU Council in Febru­
ary 2011. Because the author’s research in STP 
predates the entry into force of this new protocol, 
it has not been included in the analysis. Suffice 
it to note here that the substance of the previous 
protocol remains largely unaltered in the new 
one.
The Santomean agreement contains 
one single provision relating to con­
servation and management of fishery 
resources, namely article 5, where, in 
a rather vague formulation, it is stated 
that “[t]he parties undertake to coor­
dinate action, either directly or within 
international organizations, to ensure 
the management and conservation of 
the living resources, particularly in the 
eastern­central Atlantic and in respect 
of highly migratory species, and to fa­
cilitate the relevant scientific research” 
(Council Regulation, 1984: art. 5).
The Cape Verdean text of 1990 adds 
a couple of provisions relating to the 
actual implementation of conservation 
measures by the government: paragraph 
3 of article 3 requires that such measures 
be objective and based on science, and 
that they are not disadvantageous to EC 
vessels relative to other foreign fleets 
(Council Regulation, 1990). Article 8 
lays down the generic principles for 
revising the protocol—in particular 
the financial counterpart—in case the 
agreed fishing opportunities are affected 
by conservation measures. The Cape 
Verdean agreement has one further ad­
dition relative to the Santomean one that 
is relevant for the management of fish 
stocks, namely article 6, which obliges 
the masters of EC vessels to deliver 
catch statements to the competent au­
thorities in CV. It should, however, be 
noted that, although the main text of the 
1984 STP agreement is silent in regards 
to this issue, the respective annex does 
make reference to annual statements of 
catch used for determining the value of 
license fees paid by shipowners. 
Joint committees were established in 
accordance with articles 8 and 9 of the 
STP and CV agreements, respectively, 
as structures for monitoring imple­
mentation of the agreements and for 
reviewing the respective annexes and 
protocols. All other provisions, per­
taining to area of application, duration, 
entry into force, dispute resolution, and 
payment of financial counterparts are 
equal, with a subtle difference in this 
latter aspect. Indeed, article 6 of the STP 
agreement states that the return for fish­
ing opportunities granted to EC vessels 
shall be the Community’s participation 
in the execution of development projects 
in the country, a provision that is absent 
from the CV agreement. In practice, 
however, there was no significant differ­
ence between the two countries in how 
the financial contribution from the EC 
was attributed.
The FPA’s signed in 2007 mark a 
significant departure from the previous 
agreements, translating the EC’s pro­
claimed concern with the sustainability 
of the activities of the fleets of its own 
member states in the waters of third 
countries. The fundamental concept 
underlying these new agreements is, 
in the words of Emma Witbooi (2008), 
that of a “policy dialogue between the 
parties aimed at promoting sustainable 
fishing” (p. 673). The return paid by the 
EC for access to fish stocks in partner 
countries will take the form of financial, 
technological, and scientific assistance 
aimed at the “progressive development 
and implementation of a [sound fisheries 
management] policy” (p. 673).
The presence of a common policy 
background underpinning all FPA’s 
is evidenced by the fact that the 2007 
Santomean and Cape Verdean agree­
ments are, mutatis mutandis, identical. 
Their scope comprises the principles, 
rules, and procedures governing not 
only access of EC vessels to the fishery 
resources of these countries, but also co­
operation towards responsible fisheries, 
cooperation on surveillance and control 
measures, and partnerships between 
European and local companies. 
The stated principles guiding the 
FPA’s have been expanded to include 
responsible fishing, as per the respective 
FAO Code of Conduct; nondiscrimina­
tion of fleets fishing in Santomean and 
Cape Verdean waters; good economic 
and social governance; respect for the 
state of fish stocks; and, in regards to the 
signing on of non­European seamen, the 
right to freedom of association, collec­
tive bargaining, and nondiscriminatory 
treatment—in accordance to the Inter­
national Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (Council Regulation, 
2006; 2007). 
With regard to the principle of re­
specting the status of fish stocks, both 
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the protocols and the annexes to the 
FPA’s contain measures relative to the 
monitoring and controlling of fishing 
activities, as well as to the review of 
agreed fishing opportunities and related 
financial compensations. Conversely, 
in respect to the principle of good 
economic and social governance—in 
adherence to which the FPA’s are to be 
implemented—no suggestion is made 
as to its meaning, how it can be put 
into practice, how this practice can be 
assessed, nor to how such assessment 
might compromise implementation of 
the agreements as a whole. The practical 
usefulness of this particular principle is 
thus difficult to grasp.
Important objectives of the FPA’s 
include cooperation in formulating and 
monitoring the implementation of the 
national fisheries policies in each of 
the countries, and in evaluating actions, 
measures, and programs implemented 
under the agreements. In regard to the 
former, a new provision was included 
to enable the reassessment of the terms 
of financial support based on results 
of the joint program for implementing 
the national fisheries policies (article 7, 
point 3.d).
Article 4 of the FPA’s, termed “Scien­
tific cooperation,” deals primarily with 
the principles for cooperation in the 
evaluation of fishery resources in the 
waters of the two countries. As with the 
previous agreements, this is to be done 
in consultation with regional fisheries 
management organizations. The provi­
sions relating to the access by EC vessels 
to Santomean and Cape Verdean waters 
(art. 5), licenses (art. 6), and financial 
contributions (art. 7) retain most of the 
requirements already present in the later 
protocols to the 1984 and 1990 agree­
ments. With regard to this latter article, 
the list of domains for targeted support 
listed in earlier protocols is replaced in 
the FPA’s by the mere indication that the 
EC shall provide financial support to the 
countries’ fisheries policies. 
A relatively ambitious set of measures 
is proposed to enhance “cooperation 
among economic operators and in 
civil society” (art. 8), consisting of 1) 
encouragement of economic, scien­
tific, and technical cooperation in the 
fisheries sector and related sectors; 2) 
information exchange on fishing and fish 
processing techniques; 3) facilitation 
of the development of businesses and 
investments; 4) the setting up of joint 
enterprises; and 5) in the case of CV, 
the development of an action plan for 
fish landings in this country. The joint 
committees are renewed by means of ar­
ticle 9. The remaining provisions in the 
FPA’s, addressing legal­administrative 
procedures are equivalent to those of 
the previous agreements.
On Track for Sustainable 
and Responsible Fisheries?
The most frequent criticisms of the 
fisheries agreements between the EC 
and lower income countries have been 
directed at the level of fishing effort 
by the EC fleet, at the lack of effective 
control of the activities of this fleet, 
and at the generically poor integration 
of the activities carried out under the 
agreements with the economies of the 
partner countries. In this section, these 
three aspects are discussed in relation 
to the EC fisheries agreements with 
CV and STP. The discussion follows 
the evolution of provisions pertaining 
to the three aspects throughout the suc­
cessive protocols. In particular, fishing 
effort and the control of fleet activities is 
discussed in terms of the fishing oppor­
tunities conceded to EC shipowners and 
of how these and the movements of EC 
vessels in Cape Verdean and Santomean 
waters are controlled. 
A related aspect is the size and nature 
of the financial counterparts to the agree­
ments, which is analyzed next, with em­
phasis on the follow­up of the funds paid 
by the EC to each of the countries. Fi­
nally, economic integration is discussed 
in terms of the landing of catches and 
the use of supplies and services in Cape 
Verdean and Santomean ports, as well as 
of the signing on of seamen from these 
two countries on board Community 
vessels operating under the agreements.
Fishing Opportunities and  
Control of Fleet Activities
Table 7 displays, for each of the proto­
cols to the STP and CV agreements, the 
main elements relative to agreed fish­
ing opportunities, namely number and 
type of vessels and maximum volumes 
of catch. It shows that fishing effort 
has been kept at fairly constant levels 
throughout the successive protocols. In 
terms of target species, with the excep­
tion of relatively limited effort directed 
at demersal species in CV protocols up 
to 2004 and the two experimental fish­
ing campaigns, all fishing opportunities 
refer to tuna and other large migratory 
pelagic species. 
The system proposed in the agree­
ments for assessing adherence to the ne­
gotiated fishing opportunities has been 
the production of catch statements by 
the masters of EC fishing vessels. These 
statements are then communicated to 
the authorities in the EC and in each 
of the two African states. This system 
has become increasingly complex with 
the successive protocols, in response 
to demands for more efficient control 
of EC fleet activities. This evolution is 
reviewed next.
In the 1984 STP protocol, EC vessels 
were required to submit yearly catch 
statements for the exclusive purpose 
of calculating yearly license fees. No 
explicit reference was made to purposes 
of controlling fishing activities or man­
aging fishery resources. In respect of 
the payment of license fees, it stipulates 
that all advance installments should 
be deducted from the final payment, 
which in turn should be adjusted to the 
total declared catches. Hence if the fee 
equivalent to a certain total declared 
catch were inferior to the advance pay­
ment, the shipowner would be entitled 
to a reimbursement. 
That such a system, under condi­
tions of little or no surveillance as 
those prevailing in the waters of STP, 
in effect constituted an incentive for 
under­reporting is the likely reason why 
this provision was replaced in the 1987 
amendment. From then onward, ship­
owners were no longer entitled to any 
reimbursement of the balance between 
advance payments and fees for de­
clared catches. This provision has been 
retained in all subsequent protocols in 
both countries, including the most recent 
FPA protocols. An additional measure 
included in the 1987 STP protocol was 
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Table 7.—Fishing opportunities in the protocols to the EC fisheries agreements with STP and CV.
Period	 No.	of	vessels1	 Catch	volumes
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe
	 1984–87	 27	freezer	tuna	vessels	 4,000	t/yr	tuna
	 1987–90	 54	freezer	tuna	seiners	 9,500	t/yr	tuna
	 10	P&L	tuna	vessels
	 1990–93	 46	freezer	tuna	seiners	 Not	mentioned
	 	 5	P&L	tuna	vessels
	 1993–96	 40	freezer	tuna	seiners	 9,000	t/yr	tuna
	 	 8	P&L	tuna	vessels	or	SLL
	 1996–99	 37	freezer	tuna	seiners	 9,000	t/yr	tuna
	 	 7	P&L	tuna	vessels
	 25	SLL	
	 1999–2002	 36	freezer	tuna	seiners	 8,500	t/yr	tuna
	 	 7	P&L	tuna	vessels
	 33	SSL	
	 2002–062	 36	freezer	tuna	seiners	 8,500	t/yr	tuna;
	 	 2	P&L	tuna	vessels	 No	initial	quota	for	deepwater	crab
	 25	SLL
	 	 3	vessels	<250	GRT	for	deepwater	crab,	 
	 simultaneously	
	 2006–10	 25	freezer	tuna	seiners	 8,500	t/yr	tuna
	 18	SLL	
Cape	Verde
	 1991–94	 21	freezer	tuna	seiners	 Not	mentioned
	 24	P&L	tuna	vessels	or	SLL
	 	 2	BLL	<210	GRT
	 	 2	vessels	for	experimental	cephalopod	fishing
	 1994–97	 23	freezer	tuna	seiners	 4,850	t/yr	tuna
	 17	P&L	tuna	vessels	or	SLL	 No	quota	for	other	species
	 	 3	BLL	<210	GRT	
	 1997–2000	 37	freezer	tuna	seiners	 5,000	t/yr	tuna
	 10	P&L	tuna	vessels	 No	quota	for	other	species
	 26	SLL
	 	 3	BLL	<210	GRT
	 2001–053	 37	freezer	tuna	seiners	 7,000	t/yr	tuna
	 18	P&L	tuna	vessels	 No	quota	for	other	species
	 62	SLL
	 BLL:	avg.	630	GRT/month,	max.	4	vessels	 
	 simultaneously	
	 2006–11	 25	freezer	tuna	seiners	 5,000	t/yr	tuna
	 11	P&L	tuna	vessels
	 48	SLL
1	P&L	=	pole	and	line;	SLL	=	surface	longliners;	BLL	=	bottom	longliners;	GRT	=	Gross	Registered	Tonnage.
2	An	extension	was	made	 to	 the	2002–05	protocol	 to	 include	 the	period	between	1	 June	2005	and	31	May	2006.	The	
exploratory	study	on	deepwater	crab,	which	had	not	been	carried	out	under	the	first	year	of	the	2002–05	protocol,	was	
transferred	to	the	extension	period	(CEC,	2005).
3	An	extension	was	made	to	the	2001–04	protocol	to	include	the	period	between	1	July	2004	and	30	June	2005.	
the verification, by a regional “specialist 
scientific body,” of the veracity of catch 
statements (Council Regulation, 1987: 
annex, no. 4). How this was to be carried 
out was not explained in the protocol.
The 1990 STP protocol had two 
noteworthy additions that also appeared 
in the 1991 CV protocol. First, the 
regional specialist scientific body was 
replaced by the Institut de la Recherche 
Scientifique et Technique d’Outre-Mer 
in France and the Instituto Español de 
Oceanografia in Spain as the organiza­
tions responsible for verifying catch 
data. In this respect, it is relevant to note 
that the two largest EC fleets operating 
in both STP and CV were, and continue 
to be, the Spanish and the French. This 
provision has been included up to the 
current FPA protocols, with the Instituto 
de Investigação das Pescas e do Mar in 
Portugal joining its Spanish and French 
counterparts in the protocols after 2001 
(Portugal having the third largest fleet 
operating under the agreements). In the 
CV protocols after 1997, the local INDP 
was included in that list of organizations. 
The second addition was the obliga­
tion for EC vessels to keep a fishing 
log of all activities carried out while 
inside the STP fishing zone. This was 
the first measure aimed explicitly at 
monitoring fishing activities, in theory 
allowing local authorities some mea­
sure of control over what was taking 
place in their waters. This provision has 
unfortunately had few visible results 
in terms of the actual follow up of EC 
vessels by Santomean and Cape Verdean 
authorities. Nonetheless, efforts were 
made to improve the effectiveness of the 
logbooks as a tool for monitoring fishing 
activities. In the 1996 STP protocol it 
was made explicit that logbooks had to 
be filled in irrespective of the size of the 
catch, and that vessel masters should in­
dicate whether their vessel was inside or 
outside of the STP fishing zone.25 More­
25 Despite this provision, the ex­post evaluation 
conducted halfway through the 2002–05 STP 
protocol noted that, because of incorrect entries 
in the logbooks, it was “not clear whether they 
are declaring zero catch in the São Tomé and 
Príncipe EEZ because they have not been in the 
EEZ, or because they have been in the EEZ and 
have caught nothing” (Oceanic Développement 
et al.5:86).
over, the frequency of communicating 
the logbooks to Santomean authorities 
was increased from once every 45 days 
to once every 15 working days. 
The 1999 and 2002 STP protocols 
contain a provision allowing officials 
from STP to board EC fishing vessels 
for the purpose of inspecting and moni­
toring fishing activities. An equivalent 
measure is absent from the 2001 CV 
protocol, which instead grants Cape 
Verdean authorities the right to suspend 
the licenses of, or impose fines to vessels 
not complying with the catch statement 
requirements. These provision have 
been kept in the protocols to the 2007 
FPA’s without any major alterations. 
One important addition, however, was 
that the authorities of both countries 
have been allowed to impose sanctions 
on foreign perpetrators in accordance 
to their respective national regulatory 
framework. This possibility has never 
been used. 
The main justification for EC fisheries 
agreements with CV and STP to only 
cover pelagic migratory species is that 
these are not targeted by the artisanal 
fleets of these countries. Artisanal fisher­
men operate predominantly within a few 
nautical miles from the coast and target 
mainly demersal and small pelagic spe­
cies. The underlying aim is to prevent 
EC fleets from directly competing with 
artisanal fleets and thereby safeguard 
the fisheries livelihoods of coastal com­
munities. Those EC agreements where 
this has not been observed have been 
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subject to criticism, as in the case of 
the inclusion of coastal trawling in the 
former agreement with Senegal (Stilwell 
et al., 2010; IFREMER21).
As summarized in Table 8, separation 
of the activities of EC and domestic 
fleets in the waters of CV and STP 
involved the delimitation of the fishing 
zones accessible to Community ves­
sels. From being allowed to operate in 
the entire Santomean EEZ until the late 
1990’s, EC vessels are currently only al­
lowed beyond 12 nmi from the coasts of 
both countries. The same table reviews 
the provisions relative to control of 
vessel movements in and out of fishing 
zones. The substance of these provi­
sions has, for the most part, remained 
unchanged since the 1990’s.
In all protocols with both STP and 
CV, the requirements for notification of 
movements in and out of fishing zones 
have been accompanied by a provision 
related to the taking on board of fisheries 
Table 8.—Provisions related to fishing zones in the protocols to the EC fisheries agreements with STP and CV.
São Tomé e Príncipe
Fishing	zones		 Control	of	movements	into	and	out	of	fishing	zone
Cape Verde
Fishing	zones3	 Control	of	movements	in	and	out	of	fishing	zone
Protocols	between	1991	and	2001
Beyond	12	nmi	for	tuna	seiners	and	SLL
Beyond	six	nmi	for	P&L	vessels
From	the	base	line	for	live	bait	fishing	and	BLL
Protocols	between	2001	and	2005
Beyond	12	nmi	for	tuna	seiners	and	SLL
Beyond	six	nmi	for	P&L	vessels	and	BLL
From	the	base	line	for	live	bait	fishing
2006–11	protocol	(FPA)
Beyond	12	nmi	for	all	EC	vessels
Protocols	up	to	1996
EC	vessels	must	notify	STP	authorities	of	quantify	of	fish	on	board	when	entering	or	
leaving	the	fishing	zone.	Failure	to	notify	implies	withdrawal	of	license.
1996–99	protocol
EC	vessels	must	notify	STP	authorities	of	their	position	and	volumes	of	catch	within	
three	hours	of	entering	or	leaving	the	zone,	and	every	third	day	while	fishing	in	the	
zone.	Failure	to	notify	implies	withdrawal	of	license.
Protocols	between	1999	and	2006
EC	vessels	must	notify	STP	authorities	of	their	intention	to	enter	or	leave	the	zone	24h	
in	advance;	when	departing,	must	communicate	estimated	catch	in	STP	waters.	Failure	
to	notify	implies	withdrawal	of	license.
2006–10	protocol	(FPA)
EC	vessels	must	notify	STP	authorities	of	their	intention	to	enter	or	leave	the	zone	at	
least	three	hours	in	advance;	when	departing,	must	communicate	amount	and	species	
of	fish	held	on	board.	Failure	to	notify	implies	withdrawal	of	license.
1984–87	protocol
Entire EEZ
1987–90	protocol
Beyond	12	nmi	for	freezer	trawlers1,	entire	EEZ	for		all	others
Protocols	between	1990	and	1999
Entire EEZ
1999–2002	protocol
Beyond	12	nmi
Protocols	between	2002	and	2006
Beyond	12	nmi	and	excluding	the	joint	development	zone	with	Nigeria2;	From	the	650	m	
isobath	for	vessels	targeting	deepwater	crab
2006–10	protocol	(FPA)
Beyond	12	nmi	and	excluding	the	joint	development	zone	with	Nigeria
1Freezer	trawlers	never	actually	operated	under	the	EC	fisheries	agreement	with	STP.	The	respective	provision	was	eliminated	from	subsequent	protocols.
2See	Decreto	Presidencial	No.	8-A,	2001.
3P&L	=	pole	and	line;	SLL	=	surface	longliner;	BLL	=	bottom	longliner.
1991–94	protocol
EC	vessels	must	notify	CV	authorities	of	their	position	when	entering	or	leaving	the	
zone.	While	fishing	in	the	zone	they	must	communicate	position	and	catch	every	third	
day.	When	leaving	must	communicate	total	catch	in	CV	waters.
1994–97	protocol
Same	as	1991-94	protocol,	but	without	obligation		 to	report	every	third	day.
Protocols	between	1997	and	2005
EC	vessels	must	notify	CV	authorities	of	their	position	and	volumes	of	catch	within	three	
hours	of	entering	or	leaving	the	zone,	and	once	every	week	while	fishing	in	the	zone.	
Failure	to	notify	implies	withdrawal	of	license.
2006–11	protocol	(FPA)
EC	vessels	must	notify	CV	authorities	of	their	intention	to	enter	or	leave	the	zone	at	
least	three	hours	in	advance	and	of	amount	and	species	of	fish	held	on	board;	when	
departing,	must	communicate	position.	Failure	to	notify	implies	withdrawal	of	license.
observers. The evolution of the respec­
tive provisions is summarized in Table 9.
One would expect that this set of 
improvements and additions to the pro­
visions relative to the taking on board of 
observers would have corresponded to 
a real imperative of improving this par­
ticular control mechanism for the sake of 
better monitoring and managing fishing 
activities. Every new requirement would 
be justified as necessary for overcoming 
and eliminating a perceived deficiency 
in previous protocols. However, neither 
of the two countries was ever capable of 
developing and systematically imple­
menting the procedures for the embar­
kation of observers on fishing vessels 
operating under the agreements with the 
EC. In other words, in none of the agree­
ments were the requirements regarding 
onboard observers ever implemented 
in full: neither the relatively straight­
forward requirements in the 1984 STP 
protocol, nor any of the elaborations in 
later ones. These shortcomings, identi­
fied in the ex-post evaluations of the two 
agreements commissioned by the EC in 
2003–2004 (Oceanic Développement et 
al.5, 26), persist up to this day.
Control and Communication  
of Fishing Effort Data
The fishing effort of European fleets 
operating in Cape Verdean and Santo­
mean waters follow from the opportuni­
ties agreed by the two parties to each of 
the agreements. As reviewed in Table 7 
above, these opportunities are defined in 
terms of number and type of vessels and 
of total allowable catches for the agreed 
target species. Tunas and other pelagic 
26 Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic 
Resources Management Ltd & Megapesca Lda. 
2004b. Interim/ex post evaluation of the current 
protocol to the fisheries agreement between the 
European Community and the Republic of Cape 
Verde, and analysis of the impact of the future 
protocol on sustainability, including ex ante eval­
uation. Unpubl. final rep., FPA 06/CV/04.
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Table 9.—Provisions in the protocols to the EC fisheries agreements with STP and CV related to taking observers on board.
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe	
Protocols	between	1984	and	1990
At	the	request	of	STP	authorities,	observers	should	be	taken	on	board	only	for	
conducting	spot	checks	on	the	catches.
Protocols	between	1990	and	1996
Same	as	earlier	protocols,	with	the	addition	that	vessel	masters	should	facilitate	the	
task	of	observers	on	board.
1996–99	protocol
Same	as	earlier	protocols,	with	the	addition	that	STP	authorities	should	cover	
observers’	wages,	whereas	shipowners	cover	observers’	travel	costs.
1999–2002	protocol
At	the	request	of	STP	authorities,	observers	should	be	taken	on	board	to	observe	
fishing	activities,	verify	vessel	position,	collect	biological	samples	for	research,	register	
fishing	gear	used,	and	verify	catch	data.	Observers	may	not	interfere	with	fishing	
activities	and	have	a	duty	of	confidentiality.	Shipowner	must	pay	10	Euro/day	to	STP	
authorities	while	observers	are	on	board,	and	cover	observers’	travel	costs.	STP	
authorities	cover	observers’	wages.
2002–06	protocol
Same	as	earlier	protocol,	with	the	addition	that	observers	should	produce	an	activity	
report	of	the	work	on	board,	including	an	interim	statement	of	catches.
2006–10	protocol	(FPA)
Same	as	earlier	protocol,	with	the	addition	that	observers’	tasks	include	verifying	
by-catch	percentages	and	estimating	discards	of	commercial	species.	Observers	are	to	
be	chosen		from	a	pool	compiled	by	the	local	RFMO,	upon	request	of	STP	authorities.
Cape	Verde	
1991–94	protocol
At	the	request	of	CV	authorities,	observers	should	be	taken	on	board	vessels	>150	GRT	
to	check	on	catches.	Observers	should	be	granted	every	facility	to	carry	out	their	duties.	
CV	authorities	should	cover	observers’	wages,	whereas	shipowners	cover	observers’	
travel	costs.
Protocols	between	1994	and	2000
Similar	to	the	previous	protocol,	but	without	the	vessel	size	limitation	(150	GRT).	
Instead,	CV	authorities	indicate	which	vessels	must	take	on	board	observers.
2001–05	protocol
At	the	request	of	CV	authorities,	observers	should	be	taken	on	board	to	observe	fishing	
activities,	verify	vessel	position,	collect	biological	samples	for	research,	register	fishing	
gear	used,	and	verify	catch	data.	Observers	may	not	interfere	with	fishing	activities	and	
have	a	duty	of	confidentiality.	They	must	also	produce	an	activity	report	of	their	work	
on	board.	Shipowner	must	cover	observers’	travel	costs,	whereas	CV	authorities	cover	
observers’	wages.	Terms	of	observers’	embarkation	agreed	between	(representatives	
of)shipowners	and	CV	authorities.	
2006–11	protocol	(FPA)
Same	as	earlier	protocol,	with	the	addition	that	observers’	tasks	include	verifying	
by-catch	percentages	and	estimating	discards	of	commercial	species.	Observers	are	
to	be	chosen	from	a	pool	compiled	by	the	RFMO,	upon	request	of	CV	authorities.	The	
RFMO	covers	observers’	wages	and	social	security	costs	(in	part	financed	by	license	
fees	paid	by	shipowners).
migratory species have been the core of 
all past protocols, and the current FPA’s 
refer exclusively to them. 
Catch levels are negotiated freely by 
the parties, taking into consideration 
stock assessments and management 
proposals issued by the International 
Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the regional 
fisheries management organization 
(RFMO) for tuna, billfish, and oceanic 
sharks in the Atlantic. Neither the EC 
nor any of the two partner countries 
has ever conducted their own stock as­
sessments prior to negotiating fishing 
opportunities, a situation that was earlier 
found to extend to the whole of West 
Africa (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002). 
The stock assessments produced by 
ICCAT of the pelagic migratory species 
covered by the agreements with CV and 
STP give an account of considerable 
levels of uncertainty regarding the status 
of these stocks (ICCAT, 2010). The 
same is to say that decisions regarding 
the fishing opportunities negotiated in 
these agreements lack solid evidence 
relative to ecologically sustainable 
levels of exploitation, a situation that 
occurred in most of the previous agree­
ments (ADE et al., 2002). 
Failure to accurately determine the 
size of the stocks and the level of ex­
ploitation that these agreements can 
sustain undermines the very legal un­
derpinnings of the fisheries agreements. 
Recall, from above, that article 62 of the 
UNCLOS enables sovereign states to 
give foreign fleets access to the surplus 
of fish stocks not caught by domestic 
fleets. Put simply, in an ideal situation, 
if the known available stock was A and 
the catch of the national fleet was C, 
then a surplus S=A– C could be safely 
negotiated with a given foreign fleet. 
However, in the two cases discussed 
here, not only is there high uncertainty 
as to the size of the available stock, but 
also neither of the countries has ever 
produced entirely reliable estimates of 
the respective domestic catches. There 
is, then, no reliable means of estimating 
the surplus stock that, in part, is sold to 
the EC.
The uncertainties surrounding the 
stocks negotiated by the EC and CV and 
STP are compounded by the generalized 
inability of these two countries to ef­
fectively monitor and inspect EC fishing 
vessels operating in their waters. This 
is a generalized problem throughout 
most of West Africa (ADE et al., 2002; 
Witbooi, 2008; SSNC, 2009). In STP, 
neither the coast guard nor the fisheries 
authority have the means to patrol the 
country’s EEZ. A radar system, installed 
in recent years with American donor 
money, covers parts of the country’s 
EEZ, but it has so far not been used 
for tracking EC fishing vessels. In this 
respect, a vessel monitoring system 
(VMS) protocol is attached to both 
FPA’s with STP and CV. Regrettably, 
as of April 2011, none of these VMS 
protocols was yet in force, due primarily 
to lack of necessary infrastructure and 
equipment.
Because both countries lack the 
means to control and inspect vessels at 
sea, the checks that are occasionally car­
ried out on EC fishing vessels only look 
at documentation and smaller formal 
obligations, and only when vessels call 
at local ports. Hence there are no means 
of verifying the veracity of declarations 
of entry into and departure from the 
Santomean or the Cape Verdean fishing 
zone, let alone the composition, size, 
and origin of the respective catches.
Neither country has observers regu­
larly placed on board EC vessels. In 
2000, a program was run in CV for train­
ing 20 observers who were then to be 
engaged on a part­time basis. By 2002, 
only two observers had been deployed 
on EC vessels (Oceanic Développe­
ment et al.26), and the authorities have 
not been able to make use of that pool 
of trained professionals since, as most 
have opted for other careers. In STP no 
observer has ever been placed on board 
Community vessels. 
Recall, from Table 9, that it is the 
governments of partner countries that 
bear the costs with wages and subsis­
tence allowances of observers placed 
on board EC vessels operating in 
their waters. This places an additional 
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financial burden on generally poorly 
resourced state administrations in those 
countries, and constitutes a deterrent to 
these states demanding the embarkation 
of observers. It is questionable whether 
it should not be the wealthier EC to 
cover those costs.
At the same time that authorities in 
the two countries are unable to monitor 
the activities of the EC fishing fleet, 
there are frequent accusations that 
large foreign fishing vessels frequently 
trespass the 12 nmi exclusion limit. Re­
cently, Cape Verdean authorities com­
plained to EC representatives of such 
trespasses, having been duly reassured 
that the Commission would notify the 
member states concerned (Commission 
mixte CV-CE27). Claims such as these 
occasionally make their way into the 
national media in both countries, from 
where they feed the discontent with the 
presence of foreign vessels that operate 
with perceived impunity. 
The reporting of catch data by EC 
vessels is highly inconsistent in both 
CV and STP. The problem is not new, 
and has been brought to the attention 
of the EC in the evaluations of both 
agreements conducted in 2004 (Oce­
anic Développement et al.5, 26), as well 
as in previous assessments of the EC 
external fisheries policy (ADE et al., 
2002). In one of those evaluations, the 
authors concluded that the reported 
data constituted “no good basis for 
national fishery statistics” (Oceanic 
Développement et al.5:78). At present, 
the information on catches provided to 
the fisheries authorities in each of the 
countries by the EC fleet is not only 
scarce and irregular, but frequently 
also inconsistent with data generated by 
ICCAT. It is worth recalling, in regards 
to this point, that catch declarations are 
filled in voluntarily by vessel masters 
using a form developed by ICCAT and 
which is used to report to this organi­
zation, to the EC, and to the fisheries 
authorities in CV and STP. Hence it is 
hardly comprehensible that discrepan­
cies exist between the aggregate catch 
statements that Cape Verdean and 
Santomean authorities receive from 
ICCAT and those they receive from 
the EC. However, these discrepancies 
do exist, as brought to the attention of 
the EC during the last joint committee 
meeting with Cape Verdean authorities 
(Commission mixte CV-CE27).
In STP, the failure of the EC fleet 
in complying with the requirements of 
the FPA in terms of declaring catches 
contrasts markedly with the procedure 
followed by the Japanese tuna fleet oper­
ating in the same waters, in which every 
Japanese vessel files a weekly report to 
the Directorate­General for Fisheries 
containing, among other items, data on 
vessel position and on catch size and 
composition. 
Adding to this is the apparent con­
tradiction in the studied EC agreements 
that, despite low levels of declared 
catches, the EC insists on renewing the 
agreements, frequently arguing for an 
increase in fishing opportunities. If, as 
the catch statements produced by EC 
vessels show, actual catches recurrently 
fall below the negotiated quotas, why 
then argue for their expansion, when 
this implies a proportional increase in 
counterpart funds? This issue appears, 
again, to be a recurrent one, the EC’s 
attention having been drawn to it back 
in 2004 (Oceanic Développement et 
al.5, 26).
On the whole, the situation in both 
countries of their very limited capability 
to monitor and inspect the activities of 
EC fishing vessels is a strong incentive 
for unreported overfishing. At the very 
least, it provides no deterrent to such 
practices (Oceanic Développement and 
Megapesca Lda.28), even if the sanc­
tions for vessels caught fishing illegally 
are severe. These include withdrawal 
of fishing permits, refusal of access to 
Community ports (other than the home 
27 Commission mixte Cap Vert–Communauté 
européenne. 2010. Procès verbal de la commis-
sion mixte tenue à Praia le 30 Novembre 2010. 
Online at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/inter­
national/agreements/joint_committees/cape_
verde_301110_fr.pdf, accessed on 14 Apr. 2011.
28 Oceanic Développement and Megapesca Lda. 
2009. Revue des éléments de la stratégie du 
secteur e du plan directeur des Pêches de São 
Tomé et Principe dans le cadre de láppui sectoriel 
prévu dans l’Accord de Partenariat de Pêche CE/
São Tomé et Principe pour la période 2006-2010. 
Unpubl. final rep. (PT) 13/STP_2/09, 77 p.
port), prohibition of transshipment or 
sale of catches, and, eventually, the 
seizure of vessel and fishing gear (Coun­
cil Regulation, 2008: ch. VII and IX). 
However, as highlighted in the past, “the 
weak or practically nonexistent control 
system does not allow noncompliance 
with regulations to be reported” (ADE 
et al., 2002:43), which probably is part 
of the reason why neither of the coun­
tries has ever imposed sanctions on EC 
vessels that fail in their reporting obli­
gations.29 Both countries are currently 
working towards the strengthening of 
their surveillance capabilities at sea, but 
it will certainly be a few years before 
they can effectively control and inspect 
foreign vessels fishing in their waters.
Size and Nature of  
Financial Counterparts
Table 10 summarizes the financial 
counterparts attached to each of the 
protocols to the STP and CV agree­
ments, in terms of disbursements by 
the Community and license fees paid 
by shipowners. 
The EC lays great emphasis on the 
fact that part of the financial counterpart 
for fishing opportunities paid to partner 
countries is earmarked for specific 
development programs in the fisheries 
sector. In respect of the agreements with 
CV and STP, the evolution of these so-
called “targeted measures” through the 
successive protocols is reviewed next.
Article 6 of the 1984 STP agreement 
provided for the counterpart funds to be 
channeled to the execution of develop­
ment projects in the country. However, 
the respective protocol offered no indi­
cation of how and where the money was 
to be spent. Indeed, what the protocol 
states is that the yearly rate of 180,000 
ECU is intended to “cover fishing 
activities,” suggesting that no form of 
development cooperation was actually 
envisioned. 
It was only with the following pro­
tocol that a first break­down of the 
financial counterpart was considered. 
29 The other part of the reason is that the Cape 
Verdean and Santomean states do not wish to see 
the financial counterparts cut down because of 
reduced fishing opportunities that such sanctions 
might entail.
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Table 10.—Value and nature of compensations in the protocols to the bilateral fisheries agreements between the 
EC and STP and CV.
Period	 Financial	counterpart1  License fees2
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe
	 1984–87	 I	-	540,000	ECU	 20	ECU/t
	 1987–90	 I	-	1,450,000	ECU	 20	ECU/t
	 II	-	450,000	ECU
	 1990–93	 I	-	1,650,000	ECU	 20	ECU/t
	 II	-	150,000	ECU
	 III	-	375,000	ECU
	 1993–96	 I	-	1,650,000	ECU	 20	ECU/t
	 II	-	250,000	ECU
	 III	-	275,000	ECU
	 1996–99	 I	-	1,800,000	ECU	+	50	ECU/t	 20	ECU/t
	 II	-	187,500	ECU
	 III	-	187,500	ECU
	 1999–2002	 I	-	956,250	Euro	+	50	Euro/t	 25	Euro/t
	 II	+	III	-	956,250
	 2002–05		 I	-	1,320,000	Euro		+	75	Euro/t	 25	Euro/t
	 II	+	III	-	880,000	Euro	 42	Euro/GRT	per	quarter	for	deepwater	crab	fishing	 
	 	 vessels
	 50,000	Euro	for	deepwater	crab	 
	 evaluation	study
	 2005–06	 I	-	382,500	Euro	+	75	Euro/t	 25	Euro/t
	 II	+	III	-	255,000	Euro	 42	Euro/GRT	per	quarter	for	deepwater	crab	fishing	 
	 	 vessels
	 50,000	Euro	for	deepwater	crab	 
	 evaluation	study
	 2006–10	 I	-	2,210,000	Euro	+	65	Euro/t	 35	Euro/t
	 II	-	442,000	Euro
Cape	Verde
	 1991–94	 I	-	1,950,000	ECU	 20	ECU/t	for	tuna	vessels
	 II	-	500,000	ECU	 100	ECU/GRT	for	BLL	per	year
	 III	-	160,000	ECU	 60	ECU/GRT	for	cephalopod	fishing	vessels	per	year
	 1994–97	 I	-	1,063,500	ECU	+	50	ECU/t	tuna	 20	ECU/t	for	tuna	vessels
	 II	-	261,500	ECU	 100	ECU/GRT	for	BLL	per	year
	 III	-	174,600	ECU
	 1997–2000	 I	-	1,086,000	ECU	+	50	ECU/t	tuna	 20	ECU/t	for	tuna	vessels
	 II	-	267,440	ECU	 130	ECU/GRT	for	BLL	per	year
	 III	-	178,300	ECU
	 2001–04	 I	-	1,200,000	Euro	+	57	Euro/t	tuna	 25	Euro/t	for	tuna	vessels
	 II	+	III	-	840,000	Euro	 168	Euro/GRT	for	BLL	per	year
	 2004–05	 I	-	400,000	Euro	+	57	Euro/t	tuna	 25	Euro/t	for	tuna	vessels
	 II	+	III	-	280,000	Euro	 168	Euro/GRT	for	BLL	per	year
	 2006–11	 I	-	1,625,000	Euro	+	65	Euro/t	 35	Euro/t	for	seiners	and	SLL
	 II	-	300,000	Euro3	 25	Euro/t	for	P&L	vessels
1	I	-	Compensation	for	access,	in	some	cases	incl.	compensation	for	additional	ton	caught;	II	-	Financing	of	specific	technical	
measures	 (see	 text	 for	 explanation);	 III	 -	 Maximum	 value	 of	 awards	 for	 study,	 practical	 training	 and	 participation	 in	
international	events.	All	figures	refer	to	the	full	duration	of	the	respective	protocol.	The	external	exchange	rate	ECU-Euro	
is	unitary.
2	P&L	=	pole	and	line;	SLL	=	surface	longliner;	BLL	=	bottom	longliner;	GRT	=	Gross	Registered	Tonnage.
3	Following	 a	 proposal	 by	 Cape	 Verdean	 authorities,	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 financial	 counterpart	 paid	 by	 the	 EC	 has	 been	
earmarked	for	targeted	actions.
From then onwards, a variable amount 
of money began to be directed towards 
the “financing of a scientific and tech­
nical program in São Tomé e Príncipe 
to improve information on the fisheries 
resources” (Council Regulation, 1987: 
art. 4), a measure that was kept until the 
replacement of the 1984 agreement with 
the FPA in 2007.30 In its initial version 
in 1987, that program consisted of three 
separate headings: improving knowl­
edge of shellfish resources, supporting 
STP’s participation in the Regional 
Fisheries Committee of the Gulf of 
Guinea and in ICCAT, and covering the 
participation of STP nationals in interna­
tional fisheries sector meetings. Another 
noteworthy addition in the 1987 proto­
col was the explicit statement that the 
government of STP was to be awarded 
sole responsibility for the management 
of the compensation funds paid by the 
EC. In respect of the funds for targeted 
measures, all that the government was 
obliged to do was to report on the results 
of the exploratory shellfish campaign.
The 1990 STP protocol retained the 
reference to the scientific and technical 
program, but transferred the detailed 
headings indicated above to new skills 
development awards. Because of this 
transfer, the amount allocated to the 
former program was reduced to one third 
as compared to the 1987 protocol, and 
the requirement was put forward that the 
program be developed jointly by STP 
and the EC, the latter eventually taking 
part in its implementation. Only upon 
reaching agreement on the components 
and contents of the program would the 
money be disbursed. Following comple­
tion, reports of implementation and re­
sults were to be submitted by Santomean 
authorities to the EC. Clearly, the EC 
aimed at exerting stricter control over 
how its money was being used, which 
is not all that surprising given the poor 
record of Santomean governments in 
making good use of its finances (Espírito 
Santo, 2009). 
The first protocol to the agreement 
with CV, covering the period 1991–94, 
30 In practice, this replacement happened in 2006, 
since implementation of the first protocol to the 
2007 FPA began to be provisionally applied from 
1 June 2006.
in spite of having identical aims re­
garding the targeted funds, imposes no 
conditionalities on how the money ought 
to be used. Despite the fact that, in the 
1990 CV protocol, the funds for the sci­
entific and technical program were three 
times as large as those in the 1991 STP 
protocol, the Office of the Secretary of 
State for Fisheries of CV was allowed 
utter discretion in the design and imple­
mentation of the program, with no EC 
involvement. Presumably, at that time 
for the EC, CV ranked higher than STP 
in terms of political and administrative 
credibility.
The first protocols of the 1990’s in 
both countries also made reference to 
specific funds for improving skills and 
knowledge of those involved in sea fish­
ing (Council Decision, 1990; Council 
Regulation, 1990). Eligible categories 
included study and practical training 
awards, participation in sessions of 
regional fisheries organizations and of 
ICCAT, and attendance at international 
meetings and courses about fisheries. 
A specific application procedure had to 
be followed for funds to be disbursed.
This identical configuration was re­
tained in the two subsequent protocols in 
both countries, changes occurring only 
in the amount of the sums disbursed. 
With the 1999 and 2001 protocols 
to the Santomean and Cape Verdean 
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agreements, respectively, some subtle 
modifications were again introduced. 
Targeted measures were regrouped 
into one single category, with detailed 
indication of eligible domains proposed 
for each country. The proposals were as 
follows: the 956,250 Euros for STP were 
meant to support the known scientific 
and technical program (286,875 Euros); 
to improve surveillance, inspection, and 
checks in fishing zones (286,875 Euros); 
to support the fisheries directorate 
(114,750 Euros); to finance study grants 
and practical training courses, as well 
as participation in regional organiza­
tions and international events (191,250 
Euros); and to assist small-scale fishing 
(76,500 Euros). 
The funds and the list of domains 
were more modest in the CV protocol: 
a total of 280,000 Euros should sup­
port scientific and technical programs 
(50,000 Euros), awards for study and 
practical training (20,000 Euros), 
participation in international fisheries 
courses and meetings (30,000 Euros), 
and improvements in quality control 
of fisheries products and in monitoring 
and surveillance (180,000 Euros). This 
latter item was particularly important 
for export fisheries in CV following the 
embargo imposed in 2000 by the EC on 
Cape Verdean fishery products because 
of inadequate quality standards. This 
justifies the high proportion of the funds 
allocated to this purpose. 
As previously, the STP protocol 
required that targeted measures be de­
veloped by mutual agreement between 
the EC and Santomean authorities, 
while full autonomy was granted to the 
fisheries ministry in CV to decide on 
the respective national program. This 
time, however, Cape Verdean authorities 
were equally obliged to report annually 
on implementation and results, similar 
to what was required in STP. The final 
protocol to the 1984 STP agreement, 
covering the period 2002–05, brought 
no changes to the nature of targeted 
measures.
The 2007 FPA’s introduced some 
modifications to the mechanisms for 
financing specific measures in the two 
countries. These are more important 
from a conceptual than from a practical 
point of view. The requirement for joint 
development of a multi­annual program 
was extended to CV, and became an 
exclusive task of the joint committee in 
both countries. But instead of departing 
from a list of ready­made headings, as 
in earlier protocols, in the protocols to 
the 2007 FPA’s those measures are to be 
selected from the set of priorities defined 
by the Santomean and Cape Verdean 
governments in the respective national 
fisheries policies. 
To be eligible for financing under the 
agreement, the measures are required to 
contribute to sustainable and responsible 
management of the sector. Other than 
this, there are no rules set a priori for 
the execution of the targeted measures. 
Again, such rules are to be agreed upon 
jointly by both parties to the agreements, 
emphasis being given to the delineation 
of objectives in terms of sustainability 
and responsibility in fisheries, and to the 
definition of processes and criteria for 
results assessment. In practice, if one 
considers that the identification of tar­
geted measures in the previous protocols 
had already resulted from consultations 
between the parties to the agreements, 
and that, at least for STP, the EC already 
had reserved itself a role in deciding how 
the measures should be put into effect, 
the new architecture does not constitute 
a major departure from that of earlier 
protocols.
Follow-up of Financial  
Counterparts to the Agreements
Having reviewed the conditionalities 
attached to the financial counterparts to 
the fishing agreements, an account is 
now provided of how the application of 
these funds is controlled in each of the 
two counties. The first component of the 
counterparts, a so­called “compensation 
fund,” explicitly constitutes a payment 
for the agreed catch volumes. Once 
transferred from the EC to the treasury 
of each partner state, the respective gov­
ernment is allowed to use the payment as 
it sees fit. The second component of the 
counterparts, so­called “targeted funds,” 
has, in turn, been subject to stricter con­
trol by the EC. In particular, there has 
been greater concern with demonstrating 
that these funds have been used for the 
development of the fisheries sector in 
the partner countries. It was seen that, 
in regards to the follow­up of targeted 
funds, slightly stricter conditions were 
imposed in STP than in CV.
Under the current protocols to the 
2007 FPA’s, and despite the recognition 
of the sovereign right of the govern­
ments of both African states to manage 
counterpart payments, targeted funds are 
disbursed only upon agreement on a set 
of interventions for implementing the 
national fisheries policy. The FPA’s also 
pledge to pursue objectives of sustain­
ability and responsibility in fisheries, as 
well as the development of the fisheries 
sector and of coastal regions in both 
countries. These are issues where the EC 
is keen on highlighting its engagement 
(CEC, 2009) 31, given past accusations 
of shortsightedness in its external fisher­
ies policy (ADE et al., 2002; Kaczynski 
and Fluharty, 2002). 
The prominence that issues of sustain­
ability and responsibility in fisheries 
have acquired in the discourse of the 
EC Commission over the past decade 
(Witbooi, 2008) is such, that it has come 
to constitute an implicit conditionality 
on the use that governments in partner 
countries decide to make of counterpart 
funds. Hence, both the EC and partner 
governments are bound, not only explic­
itly by the letter of the agreements, but 
also implicitly by the EC discourse to 
use these funds according to principles 
of sustainability and responsibility, for 
the purpose of developing the fisheries 
sector and coastal regions in partner 
countries. 
In the specific cases studied here, 
the experience with the follow­up of 
financial counterparts to the EC fisheries 
agreements has been mixed. This is the 
31 In this document, the EC Commission states the 
following (p. 22): “The main objective for activi­
ties under the external dimension of the Common 
Fisheries Policy [CFP] should be to extend the 
principles of sustainable and responsible fisher­
ies internationally. This objective must be placed 
fully within the aims of the IMP [integrated mari­
time policy] on good governance of the sea and 
the sustainable development of coastal regions. 
Other objectives that currently guide the external 
dimension of the CFP, such as maintaining the 
presence of an EU [European Union] fleet inter­
nationally and ensuring that this fleet supply the 
EU market, may be less relevant today.”
73(4) 19
result of the different regimes applicable 
to compensation and to targeted funds, 
and of the political­administrative per­
formance of each of the two countries. 
Compensation funds are, as mentioned 
above, paid directly into the national 
treasury, and from there make their way 
into the state budget and the respective 
expenditure. From the point where funds 
enter the treasury, the practice in the two 
countries varies. In CV, the Directorate-
General for Treasury has been able to 
register and trace the application of 
counterpart moneys—compensation 
and targeted funds alike—to the differ­
ent components of the Cape Verdean 
fisheries sector and policy (see Oceanic 
Développement et al.26 for figures rela­
tive to 2002–04). 
In STP, once EC payments enter 
the treasury, it is no longer possible 
to trace their path (Mata32). One may 
obviously speculate that the money 
is put to any possible and imaginable 
use by the Santomean government, as 
indeed there is nothing really hindering 
it. But one may be reassured—at least 
in part—that the money is spent in the 
fisheries sector by considering that EC 
payments during the last protocol have 
represented 36%, 22%, and 45% of the 
state budget for the fisheries sector in 
2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively.33 
More importantly, disbursements are 
conditional upon the joint approval of an 
action program based on the country’s 
priorities for the fisheries sector. In spite 
of STP not yet having defined its course 
of action in terms of fisheries policy, 
that program has been developed. The 
respective yearly installments have been 
paid by the EC following the delivery 
of reports by Santomean authorities of 
implementation of the agreed actions. 
It appears, then, that the EC is satisfied 
with how Santomean authorities have 
been using the money to implement that 
action plan.
With regard to follow­up of targeted 
funds, there are some parallels with 
the follow­up of compensation funds. 
Starting with CV, although the govern­
ment is not formally obliged to produce 
evidence that those funds are applied 
in accordance with agreed programs, 
it has regularly done so. In the current 
FPA, the definition of such a program 
has been simplified by the fact that the 
country already has a fisheries policy 
that has been implemented since 2004, 
and funds are being used to support 
several of its elements. 
In STP, as mentioned, no such policy 
exists. In fact, part of the targeted funds 
of the current FPA protocol have been 
applied in the drafting of a proposal for 
a fisheries management plan (Oceanic 
Développement and Megapesca Lda.28), 
which, by January 2010, the Directorate­
General for Fisheries was busy integrat­
ing with a similar document produced 
in parallel by FAO7, in view of coming 
up with a final national fisheries policy. 
In the past, the EC expressed discontent 
with the reporting on the implementa­
tion of targeted measures produced by 
Santomean authorities, having gone so 
far as to delay the payment of install­
ments of the respective funds (Oceanic 
Développment et al.5). However, the 
current situation appears to have im­
proved and no payments appear to have 
been withheld in recent years.
In brief, the current Santomean pro­
tocol is more stringent that the Cape 
Verdean in terms of follow-up of EC 
payments, but STP offers worse guar­
antees, not only in terms of that very 
follow­up, but also of the effective ap­
plication of funds in the fisheries sector. 
The former problem may be resolved by 
improving overall budget oversight in 
state administration, an area that the EC 
currently supports through its coopera­
tion program with STP (CEC, 2007). 
One might then expect that the current 
absence of adequate follow­up will 
progressively be overcome by enhanced 
administrative capacity. 
In regard to the actual application of 
EC payments in the fisheries sector, the 
situation is less clear. On the one hand, 
32 Mata, G,, Dir. Gen. Budget, São Tomé, STP. 
Personal commun., 28 Jan. 2010.
33 These figures consider an annual disbursement 
of 663,000 Euros by the EC as per the 2006–10 
protocol, and values allocated to the fisheries-
specific units of the Santomean Ministry for 
Agriculture, Rural Development, and Fisheries 
in each of these years. The treasury does not 
yet have the means to collect data on all actual 
disbursements, so it is not possible to calculate 
with certainty how much of the EC counterpart is 
actually spent on the fisheries sector.
recall that, in accordance with article 
7 of the FPA, the Santomean state is 
obliged to apply counterpart funds in 
the fisheries sector. In practice, although 
detailed records of budget allocations 
do not exist, it was suggested above, 
that since total fisheries budget exceeds 
the EC counterpart, the latter will most 
likely be used to finance the sector. In 
addition, although the EC itself does not 
perform any audits on the uses made of 
counterpart funds, it requires the Santo­
mean government to produce evidence 
that these uses adhere to the provisions 
of the FPA. So far, the evidence pro­
duced in the form of reports of imple­
mentation of the agreed action program 
has been convincing enough for the EC 
Commission to continue transferring 
funds to the Santomean treasury.
On the other hand, STP has a long 
tradition of not only unstable, but also 
clientelistic politics and public admin­
istration (for a detailed account up to 
2005, see Seibert, 2006), a reality that 
is widely known and openly discussed 
at all levels of the Santomean society. 
There is, in addition, evidence of an 
upsurge in state corruption in the course 
of the last decade, accompanying the in­
tensification of offshore oil exploration 
activities (Frynas et al., 2003; Vicente, 
2010). What is more, in the fisheries 
sector, there is anecdotal evidence that 
political parties regularly use equipment 
made available by cooperation partners 
to buy votes from fishermen during elec­
toral campaigns. If, on top of all this, one 
considers the state of abandonment that 
Santomean fisheries find themselves in, 
there are reasons to question whether EC 
taxpayers’ money is in reality contribut­
ing to any of the objectives stated in the 
FPA of improving the country’s fisheries 
and its overall level of development. In 
Guinea­Bissau, for example, it has been 
argued that targeted funds have been 
used in the past to support state spending 
unrelated to fisheries (Kaczynski and 
Fluharty, 2002).
In CV, the overall situation is substan­
tially different. Government structures 
function, and, despite regional dispari­
ties, are considered to provide important 
support to fishing activities at different 
levels. The export sector recovered 
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remarkably well after the end of the EC 
embargo in 2003, and there are visible 
improvements in the organization of 
the artisanal sector in general. Despite 
persistent shortages of private capital 
for investments in the sector, there is 
evidence of progress, most notably in 
terms of handling and storage equipment 
in ports, improvement of sanitary condi­
tions of fishery products (in particular 
for exports), and institutional capacity. 
How much of this can be ascribed to 
EC agreements is uncertain34, but it is 
reasonable to presume that money spent 
on Cape Verdean fisheries will result in 
improvements to this sector.
Socioeconomic Integration
Three aspects of the EC fisheries 
agreements are discussed here that 
are relevant for the integration of the 
activities of Community fleets with 
the economies of CV and STP. Those 
aspects are the landing of catches and 
the use of supplies and services in the 
two countries, and the signing on of 
Cape Verdean and Santomean seamen 
on board EC vessels. Tables 11, 12, and 
13 summarize the provisions relative to 
each of these aspects, respectively.
With respect to the provisions on 
catch landings in the 1987 STP protocol, 
Table 11.—Provisions related to the landing of catch in the protocols to the EC fisheries agreements with STP and CV.
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe	 Cape	Verde	
1991–94	protocol
Tuna	vessels	should,	if	possible	and	according	to	catch	volumes,	supply	local	canning	
factories.	By-catch	should,	when	possible,	be	made	available	to	local	authorities	at	local	
market	prices.	
All	protocols	between	1994	and	2005
Tuna	vessels	should,	if	possible	and	according	to	catch	volumes,	supply	local	canning	
factories.	Transshipment	of	at	least	5%	of	fish	caught	in	CV	waters	required	of	surface	
longliners.	Provision	related	to	by-catch	suppressed.
2006–11	protocol	(FPA)
Reduction	of	5	Euro/t	in	license	fees	for	landing	of	catch	in	CV	ports,	and	of	10	
Euro/t	for	supplying	local	fish	processing	plants.	Set	of	rules	is	defined	for	governing	
transshipments.
1984–87	protocol
No	mention.
1987–90	protocol
Freezer	trawlers	might	be	required	to	land	part	of	catch	to	meet	local	requirements.
1990–93	protocol
No	mention.
All	protocols	between1993	and	2006
Tuna	seiners	should,	on	voluntary	basis,	make	by-catch	available	to	STP	
authorities	at	agreed	price.
2006–10	protocol	(FPA)
Reduction	of	5	Euro/t	in	license	fees	for	vessels	doing	transshipment	of	fish	in	STP	
ports.	Set	of	rules	is	defined	for	governing	transshipments.
Table 12.—Provisions related to the use of local supplies and services by EC vessels in the protocols to the EC 
fisheries agreements with STP and CV.
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe	 Cape	Verde	
Protocols	between	1991	and	2001
EC	vessels	should,	when	possible,	procure	necessary	
supplies	and	services	in	CV,	under	conditions	negotiated	
by	shipowner	and	CV	authorities.
Protocols	between	2001	and	2005
EC	vessels	should	give	preference	to	local	supplies	and	
services,	provided	price	and	quality	are	equal.
2006–11	protocol	(FPA)
No	mention,	other	than	in	relation	to	landing	and	
transshipment	of	fish	(see	Table	11).
Protocols	between	1984	and	1999
No	mention.
Protocols	between	1999	and	2006
EC	vessels	should,	when	possible,	procure	necessary	
supplies	and	services	in	STP.
2006–10	protocol	(FPA)
No	mention,	other	than	in	relation	to	landing	and	
transshipment	of	fish	(see	Table	11).
34 For example, the ex-post assessment of the CV 
agreement, recently presented to the EC Com­
mission, argues that “those measures which have 
been successfully implemented substantially 
coincide with activities supported by donor proj­
ects, raising questions regarding the additionality 
of the FPA measures” (Oceanic Développement. 
2010. Ex­post evaluation of the current protocol 
to the fisheries partnership agreement between 
the European Union and Cape Verde. Final 
report, summary, 6 p. Online at http://ec.europa.
eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/cape_
verde_2010_en.pdf, accessed on 13 Apr. 2011.).
the latter does not specify what “local 
requirements” could be, or who should 
be responsible for defining these. The 
condition for EC vessels to land part of 
their catch could thus never be verified, 
and, correspondingly, landings never 
took place. A similar situation was ob­
served regarding the voluntary delivery 
of bycatch by EC vessels to authorities 
in CV and STP.
The economic incentives offered to 
EC shipowners under the most recent 
protocol do not seem to have had any 
effect either: no transshipments have 
ever been performed in STP—a failure 
for which the absence of adequate han­
dling and storage facilities certainly is 
to blame, at least in part—nor have any 
catches been landed in Cape Verdean 
ports or supplied to local canning fac­
tories. 
A closely related issue is the use of 
port facilities and the procurement of 
local supplies and services by the EC 
fishing fleet operating in the waters of 
CV and STP (Table 12). The respec­
tive provisions are few and generally 
vaguely formulated and, consequently, 
hardly enforceable. The formulation, in 
the 2001 CV protocol, that EC vessels 
should procure supplies and services 
in that country when “quality is equal” 
illustrates this argument well. Consider­
ing that much of these supplies were, 
and continue to be, fresh food products, 
determining the extent to which quality 
is equal is an imprecise and subjective 
assessment. The provision is then use­
less for the purpose of forcing EU ves­
sels to procure those supplies locally. 
The recognition of this fact, presumably, 
led to the elimination of that provision 
from the subsequent protocol. Here, the 
only mention regarding the use of local 
shore­based services is in reference to 
landings and transshipments. 
The signing on of local crews for 
EC fishing vessels may be regarded 
as an efficient way of spreading the 
benefits of the fisheries agreements to 
the population of partner countries. It 
provides employment and wages for 
crew members and their dependents, as 
well as income tax revenues to the state. 
It is thus somewhat surprising that it 
was not until 1993 that the Santomean 
government negotiated the hiring of 
national seamen into the EC agreement. 
As seen in Table 13, even then and in the 
successive protocols, the agreed provi­
sions were never particularly ambitious, 
especially if compared to those of CV 
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Table 13.—Provisions related to the signing on of local crews in the protocols to the EC fisheries agreements with 
STP and CV.
São	Tomé	e	Príncipe	 Cape	Verde1	
1991–94	protocol
Thirteen	CV	seamen	in	total,	of	which	three	in	tuna	
seiners,	eight	in	P&L	vessels,	and	two	in	SLL,	all	
assigned	to	different	vessels.	Wages	fixed	jointly	by	
shipowner	and	CV	authorities	prior	to	the	granting	
of	licenses,	the	former	covering	all	costs	with	social	
security	and	insurances.	Penalty	for	failure	to	sign	
on	seamen,	used	by	the	CV	state	for	the	training	of	
seamen.
1994–97	protocol
Nine	CV	seamen	in	total,	of	which	four	in	tuna	seiners,	
three	in	P&L	vessels	and	two	in	SLL.	Other	conditions	
equal	to	the	1991–94	protocol.
Protocols	between	1997	and	2005
Thirteen	CV	seamen	in	total,	of	which	six	in	tuna	
seiners,	three	in	P&L	vessels,	and	four	in	SLL.	Other	
conditions	equal	to	the	earlier	protocols.
2006–11	protocol	(FPA)
At	least	13	seamen	from	ACP	countries,	of	which	at	
least	six	in	tuna	seiners,	three	in	P&L	vessels	and	four	
in	SLL.	Workers’	rights	defined	in	accordance	with	
ILO	declaration.	Employment	conditions	negotiated	by	
shipowner,	(representative	of)	seamen	and	workers’	
unions,	in	liaison	with	CV	authorities.	Contracts	must	
cover	social	security	and	insurance.	Penalty	of	20	Euro/
day	for	failure	to	sign	on	ACP	seamen	while	fishing	
in	CV	waters,	used	by	the	CV	state	for	the	training	of	
seamen.
All	protocols	up	to	1993
No	mention.
Protocols	between	1993	and	1999
Three	STP	seamen	in	total,	all	assigned	to	different	
vessels.	Employment	conditions	negotiated	by	
shipowner	and	(representative	of)	seamen.
Protocols	between	1999	and	2006
Six	STP	seamen	in	total,	all	assigned	to	different	
vessels.	Penalty	for	failure	to	sign	on	seamen,	used	by	
the	STP	state	for	the	training	of	seamen.	Employment	
conditions	negotiated	by	shipowner	and	(representative	
of)	seamen.
2006–10	protocol	(FPA)
At	least	20%	of	seamen	must	be	ACP	nationals.	
Workers’	rights	defined	in	accordance	with	ILO	
declaration.	Employment	conditions	negotiated	by	
shipowner,	(representative	of)	seamen	and	workers’	
unions.	Contracts	must	cover	social	security	and	
insurance.	Penalty	of	$20US/day	for	failure	to	sign	on	
ACP	seamen	while	fishing	in	STP	waters.
1	P&L	=	pole	and	line;	SLL	=	surface	longliner.
protocols of the time, and even more so 
to those of the last protocol with Senegal 
(2002–06), where half of the non officer 
crew were required to be Senegalese 
(Sporrong et al.35).
In the protocols to the FPA’s with the 
two countries, the provisions regarding 
the signing on of local seamen suffered 
significant modifications. In general, 
the resulting set of requirements is more 
protective of local crews, and, at least on 
paper, allow for improved employment 
conditions. This is especially evident in 
the case of STP.
One important change has been the 
inclusion of seamen from countries 
other than CV or STP in the agreements. 
Shipowners are no longer restricted to 
hiring nationals from these two coun­
tries, but instead they can pick from a 
pool of seamen from ACP countries. 
Although this measure puts an end to 
the exclusiveness that Santomean and 
Cape Verdean seamen enjoyed regarding 
working on board EC vessels fishing in 
their countries’ waters, the reality is that, 
since the FPA’s with other countries in 
the region all contain identical provi­
sions, new employment opportunities 
are created for the nationals of those 
two countries in EC vessels operating 
under those other FPA’s. In practice, 
because EC vessels tend to have mul­
tiple licenses allowing them to move 
between the waters of different partner 
countries, this change is nothing but an 
adaptation of the letter of the agreement 
to the practical reality. 
Competition and  
Socioeconomic Integration
Criticism has been directed at EC 
fisheries agreements for enabling Eu­
ropean fleets to compete directly with 
local fishermen in third countries for 
the resources that they depend upon 
(Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002; SSNC, 
2009; IFREMER21). This issue has been 
highlighted especially in those cases 
where agreements include demersal spe­
35 Sporrong, N., C. Coffey, and K. Bevins. 2002. 
Fisheries agreements with third countries – is the 
EU moving towards sustainable development? 
IEEP, London, U.K., 19 p. Online at http://www.
ieep.eu/assets/154/fisheriesagreements.pdf, 
accessed on 2 Mar. 2010.
cies, as these constitute the mainstay of 
small-scale subsistence fisheries in most 
ACP countries (Mbithi Mwikya, 2006).
In the cases of the agreements with 
CV and STP, they only cover highly-
migratory species caught beyond the 
territorial sea, where domestic fleets are 
hardly present. As alluded to earlier, the 
governments of the two countries chose 
to reserve demersal species and coastal 
waters for the respective artisanal fleets, 
having progressively pushed EC vessels 
further offshore. In the past, the CV 
agreement allowed for some demersal 
fishing, and both the CV and the STP 
agreements provided for exploratory 
fishing, but none of these were ever of 
a significant scale as to interfere with 
domestic artisanal catches. So the issue 
of direct competition for resources or 
fishing areas between EC and local fleets 
has never been a very pertinent one in 
any of the cases. As for competition with 
the Cape Verdean industrial and semi-
industrial fleets, the perception in CV is 
that there still is enough fish for every­
one, and direct interactions between EC 
and local vessels are not seen as posing 
significant problems (Atanásio36). This 
36 Atanásio, N., Assoc. Fisheries Shipowners, 
Midelo, SV, CV. Personal commun., 8 Jan. 2010.
is in line with earlier assessments that 
tuna agreements did not lead to competi­
tion between local fleets and those of EC 
member states (IFREMER21).
Discontent is felt, however, towards 
the extent to which EC fleets are sub­
sidized, which enables them much 
greater efficiency than Cape Verdean 
vessels. This must be understood in 
the context of the limited investment 
capacity of Cape Verdean shipowners 
and of the fact that they target the same 
export markets as the EC distant­water 
fleet. This might, however, be more of 
a perceived problem than a real one, as 
export of fish products from CV—most 
of which are tuna products to European 
markets—have increased steadily since 
the end of the EC embargo in 2003 and 
are remarkably successful today. Also, 
it has been argued that the rent accruing 
to the CV government from catches by 
EC vessels are much higher than if the 
resources were exploited by the national 
fleet (Oceanic Développement et al.26), 
suggesting that it is economically advan­
tageous to maintain EC fleets operating 
in Cape Verdean waters. 
Nonetheless, that the government 
repeatedly chooses to sell the country’s 
fishery resources to heavily subsidized 
EC fleets is generally disapproved of by 
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fisheries professionals in CV. To them, 
the fishing opportunities granted by the 
agreements constitute a further public 
subsidy that further skews competition 
(Atanásio36). Irrespective of whether or 
not there is actual competition between 
Community and local fleets, this type of 
discontent has been reported from sev­
eral other countries in the region (SSNC, 
2009; Stilwell et al., 2010)
Broader benefits from the FPA’s to 
CV and STP may potentially accrue 
from activities such as catch landings, 
the utilization of local supplies and 
services, and employment on board EC 
vessels. Here, again, there are important 
differences between the two countries. 
As alluded to previously, despite the 
fact that both agreements encourage 
EC vessels to land their catches in CV 
and STP ports, this has never happened 
in any of the cases. The reasons are 
that in STP processing facilities are 
nonexistent, whereas in CV there are 
no economic advantages for EC ves­
sels to land catches there, as opposed 
to landing in other ports, notably in the 
Canary Islands.37 A similar situation has 
been reported regarding Community 
fleet operations in Mauritania (SSNC, 
2009). This in spite of reductions in fees 
provided for in the agreements and, in 
the case of CV, of the insistence of the 
local fisheries authorities that EC vessels 
supply local canning plants with catches 
from Cape Verdean waters (Commission 
mixte CV-CE38). 
Transshipment of fishery products is 
not possible in STP because of the inad­
equacy of infrastructure on land. In CV, 
this activity has been carried out since 
1963, initially by Asian— mainly Japa­
nese—vessels, and since the late 1970’s 
also by European vessels. A study made 
37As an indication of the price advantages for 
EC shipowners of landing catches outside CV, 
the president of the Cape Verdean fisheries ship­
owners association noted that one ton of tuna 
is sold to processing plants in CV at 80,000 
CVE, whereas in the Canary Islands it is sold at 
990,000 CVE (text footnote Atanásio36).
38 Commission mixte Cap Vert–Communauté euro - 
péenne. 2009. Procès verbal. 1ère commission 
mixte–Bruxelles, les 18 et 19 Juin 2009. Online 
at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/ 
agreements/joint_committees/cape_verde_ 
180609_fr.pdf, accessed on 4 Dec. 2009.
in the Porto Grande of Mindelo in 2006 
showed an increase in the number of 
calls of fishing vessels, reaching 281 in 
2005, of which 70% were Spanish and 
15% Portuguese (Maurício and Lima39). 
Transshipment operations totalled 80 
that same year, representing close to 
8,000 tons of handled fish products.40 
Revenues for the port administration 
alone, including port taxes and cargo 
handling fees, amounted to over 30.5 
million CVE (approx. 277,000 Euros) 
between January and August 2005 
alone, almost double the figure for all of 
2004. The estimate for all revenues to 
CV associated with calls of fishing ves­
sels at Porto Grande was put at 600–700 
million CVE in 2005 (approx. 5.5–6.4 
million Euros). Of this amount, it is 
reasonable to presume that the contribu­
tions from Spanish and Portuguese ves­
sels, representing 85% of the total, can 
be ascribed to EC fisheries agreements 
signed not only with CV, but also with 
other coastal states in the region. Other 
than at Porto Grande, transshipments of 
fishery products in CV also take place 
in the port of Praia. 
In STP, although no transshipments 
are carried out, foreign fishing vessels 
occasionally call at local ports for the 
purpose of taking onboard supplies, 
mainly fresh foodstuff. Because no 
data exists on the nationality of those 
vessels—82 vessels in 2008, down from 
197 in 2007 (ENAPORT, 2009)—nor 
on the revenue that they generate, it is 
not possible to estimate any eventual 
economic benefit resulting from EC 
vessels operating under fisheries agree­
ments. In the past, such benefits have 
been declared nonexistent (Oceanic 
Développement et al.5).
A final element worth referring to 
is employment on board EC vessels. 
In STP, as per accounts of local crew 
agencies, there are at present no known 
39 Maurício, J. P., and L. Lima. 2006. Impacto 
sócio-económico. Navios de pesca em S. Vicente. 
ENAPOR, Mindelo, SV, CV.
40 Preliminary figures for the three most recent 
years for the number of calls of fishing vessels 
and tons of transshipped fish products are 213 
calls and 3,276 t (2007), 204 calls and 6,500 t 
(2008), and 243 calls and 5,613 t (2009) (Mau­
rício, J.P., ENAPOR, Mindelo, SV, CV. Personal 
commun., 26 Mar. 2010).
local seamen taking up such posts. There 
is, however, an unknown number of 
Santomeans working on board fishing 
vessels in neighboring states. It is not 
known if those are EC vessels operating 
under agreement with these states. In the 
past, the size of this workforce has been 
estimated at 25 individuals (Oceanic 
Développement et al.5). 
In CV, there is a firmer tradition of 
nationals working on board foreign 
vessels, and at present approximately 
150 Cape Verdeans are hired by Span­
ish and Portuguese shipowners. In 2004 
this figure was stated as 121 (Oceanic 
Développement et al.26). Net monthly 
salaries start at 454 Euros, a figure that 
is deemed competitive in comparison 
to other employment opportunities in 
general, and in the artisanal fisheries 
sector in particular.41 Contracts cover 
social security discounts and include 
insurance against accidents, two things 
that Cape Verdean—and, for that matter, 
Santomean—fishermen overwhelm­
ingly do without. However, in certain 
segments of the Cape Verdean industrial 
and semi-industrial fleets, employment 
conditions are considered superior to 
those offered by European shipowners, 
not only in terms of salary, but also in 
working conditions and frequency of 
shore leaves. Conditions on board EC 
vessels are often considered too harsh, 
and thus only appealing to those lacking 
other job alternatives.
Conclusion
This paper set out to discuss aspects 
of sustainability, responsibility in fish­
ing, and socioeconomic integration of 
the EC fisheries agreements with CV 
and STP. To this end, specific provi­
sions of the agreements were reviewed, 
highlighting the increasing preoccupa­
tion of the parties with issues of fisher­
ies surveillance, catch monitoring and 
reporting, and integration of the EC 
fleet’s operations with the fisheries and 
related sectors in both countries. The 
latest FPA’s in particular abound with 
41 Estimated average monthly salaries in CV are 
499 Euros in the public and 336 Euros in the 
private sector. Monthly earnings in the artisanal 
fisheries sector may be as low as 80 Euros.
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concerns about all of these aspects, pre­
sumably as a post­CFP reform response 
of the EC to the numerous criticisms of 
earlier access agreements. 
It was argued that fishing opportuni­
ties in those agreements continue to be 
negotiated in a context of considerable 
uncertainty, in particular concerning 
knowledge about stock status, fishing 
efforts, and actual catch volumes in the 
waters of those two countries. Despite 
the large amounts of money transferred 
from the EC to the two countries over the 
past 2–3 decades, comprehensive stud­
ies of the countries’ fishery resources 
and convincing estimates of fishing 
effort have not been produced. The very 
legal precondition for the agreements, 
namely the evidence of a resource 
surplus that EC fleets may harvest, can 
actually be put into question, as neither 
available stocks, nor actual catches are 
known with exactitude. 
In this context, it is particularly wor­
risome that EC vessels continue to fail 
to report their movements and especially 
their catches to Cape Verdean and Santo­
mean authorities, in clear breach of the 
agreements. Because in both countries 
there is a generalized insufficiency of 
means to patrol the respective EEZ and 
to inspect vessels at sea, EC vessels 
operate with almost complete impunity. 
There are few, if any, means of challeng­
ing the information that these vessels 
report to the authorities or of producing 
evidence of unreported fishing activi­
ties. Partly because of this, legal action 
against vessels suspected of having 
contravened the agreements has never 
been taken.
There is scope for demanding better 
stock assessments prior to future nego­
tiation of fishing opportunities between 
the EC and these two countries. In 
part this is the work of ICCAT. In this 
regard, some authors have argued that 
tuna agreements should not be signed 
bilaterally, but instead between the EC 
and all countries sharing a regional 
stock, through the appropriate RFMO 
(Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002; Mbithi 
Mwikya, 2006; Witbooi, 2008; SSNC, 
2009; Gorez23). Besides making eco­
logical sense, this suggestion would also 
diminish the large imbalance in negotia­
tion capacity that exists today between 
the EC and each individual partner coun­
try (ADE et al., 2002; Witbooi, 2008; 
Stilwell et al., 2010). It would, however, 
require a level of cooperation among the 
regional countries on matters related to 
fisheries that does not exist today.
There is, in addition, an absolute and 
urgent need to expand the capacity of 
both CV and STP to carry out surveil­
lance and inspections at sea. This is a 
very large burden on poorly resourced 
countries with extensive maritime do­
mains, and something that will take time 
to implement. 
For this reason, the issue of the taking 
on board observers should be looked 
into with some urgency. The system cur­
rently in place has unequivocally failed. 
One may ask whether it should not be 
replaced by a system where observers 
are made compulsory, either on all or 
on randomly assigned EC vessels, and 
paid for by the EC. However, the latest 
ex-post evaluation of the CV agreement 
commissioned by the EC lays the burden 
of establishing a corps of observers 
entirely on Cape Verdean authorities 
(Oceanic Developpement34), a view that 
the Commission itself also held during 
the last meeting of the joint committee 
(Commission mixte CV-CE27).
A related aspect also in need of bet­
terment is communication of catch data. 
The burden is on the EC to impose 
stricter procedures to its vessels regard­
ing the periodicity and the exactitude 
of these communications, but also on 
the authorities in the partner countries 
to more firmly impose sanctions on EC 
vessels not fulfilling their obligations. 
Here, however, the prospect of losing 
much needed counterpart funds will 
probably continue to weigh more. 
The way in which the EC sees to 
the adequate application of counterpart 
funds can be said to have improved 
over the years. From an initial practice 
where most of the money was paid to a 
treasury account “no questions asked,” 
the 2007 FPA’s make disbursements 
more clearly conditioned on evidence 
that money will be used for advancing 
the countries’ fisheries policy. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of STP, 
where close to thirty years and several 
million Euros worth of fisheries agree­
ments do not seem to have improved a 
fisheries sector that remains in dismal 
condition. 
There are, fundamentally, two aspects 
to consider when addressing this prob­
lem. First, there is the issue of improving 
overall budgetary oversight capacity, 
which, in the case of STP, the EC is cur­
rently supporting. Improved oversight 
will enable better follow­up of the uses 
that counterpart funds are put to. 
But the most important issue is one of 
the extent to which the agreement itself 
should be conditioned upon the ability 
of Santomean authorities to effectively 
develop the fisheries sector. On one 
hand, there is a limit to how much the 
EC can interfere with domestic poli­
cies and state administration in partner 
countries. During the last protocol, for 
example, it subsidized the production 
of a fisheries policy proposal (Oceanic 
Développement and Megapesca Lda.28), 
but it cannot really impose its adoption 
on the Santomean government.
On the other hand, the fisheries agree­
ment itself is justified by its parties as an 
instrument for developing the fisheries 
sector in STP. Failing this develop­
ment—which, again, is largely what 
has happened in STP up to now—one 
may reasonably question whether the 
agreement should not be terminated, as 
it is not serving one of its fundamental 
purposes. This, however, would deprive 
the Santomean state of an important 
source of income that it needs for fi­
nancing the sector. In brief, in regards 
to this issue, the approach has been to 
continue renewing protocols based more 
on expected benefits than on observed 
improvements to the Santomean fisher­
ies sector.
Finally, the level of integration of 
activities carried out under the agree­
ments with other socioeconomic sec­
tors in the two countries is extremely 
reduced. It is limited to transshipments 
in CV—which, it was seen, can generate 
important secondary revenues—the pur­
chase of some stores, and employment 
for about 150 Cape Verdean seamen. 
In STP such benefits are minimal, and 
there are no known seamen working on 
board EC vessels. Similarly, the poverty 
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impact of the agreements has been con­
sidered nil (Oceanic Développement et 
al.5, 26; see also ADE et al., 2002; Bartels 
et al., 2007). 
With the aim of enhancing that in­
tegration, the following considerations 
can be made. First, imposing on EC 
vessels that fish caught in Cape Verdean 
waters be landed in Cape Verdean ports 
and sold to local processing plants 
will enable CV to increase its sales of 
higher value fishery products. A similar 
obligation existed, for example, in past 
EC agreements with Senegal (Sporrong 
et al.35). Currently, all valued added to 
the raw products that CV sells via the 
EC fisheries agreements accrues to the 
European states—mainly Spain—where 
that fish is processed. Such a measure, 
would, however, be met with resistance 
from the part of EC shipowners who 
currently sell their catches in European 
ports at much higher prices than those 
paid by Cape Verdean processing plants. 
In STP no such imposition is reasonable 
because the country does not have the 
necessary infrastructure to handle, store, 
or process landings from industrial 
vessels.
Second, the actual degree of utiliza­
tion of local supplies and services by 
EC vessels should be investigated, 
as there is no reliable information on 
actual benefits accruing to any of the 
countries. In particular, it is important 
to understand how much these supplies 
include locally produced goods, as op­
posed to imported ones. The former 
have the potential of extending the 
benefits of eventual procurement by 
EC fishing vessels to local producers, 
and not only to retail importers, as in 
the case of imported goods.
Third, in regard to employment of 
seamen, CV appears to have taken ad­
vantage of the latest regime that is based 
on the ACP pool of seamen rather than 
on country­based quotas. The sugges­
tion that working conditions on board 
are not adequate might merit an inves­
tigation on the part of the EC, which is 
ultimately responsible for its vessels 
adhering to the ILO standards. In STP 
it is not known with certainty if local 
seamen are working on board EC vessels 
operating under agreements with other 
countries in the region, and, if so, how 
many they are. Hence it is not possible 
to propose any measures to improve the 
current situation.
As a final word, if the FPA’s are to live 
up to their own letter, much will have to 
be achieved in terms of improving moni­
toring and surveillance of fishing opera­
tions, collection and communication of 
catch data, and socioeconomic integra­
tion of EC fleet’s activities. That little 
appears to have been achieved in all of 
these domains is a worrisome prospect 
for the future of the agreements with 
CV and STP. Responsibility rests with 
the EC and the governments of these 
two countries to make sure that FPA’s 
do foster a fair and mutually beneficial 
platform for sustainable development 
and responsible fisheries based on these 
countries’ marine resources. 
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